

TE-SAT 2016



**European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
(TE-SAT) 2016**

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FOREWORD



In 2015 the European Union (EU) experienced a massive number of casualties caused by terrorist attacks. By far the most affected Member State was France, which had to cope with losing 148 citizens and seeing more than 350 injured in attacks perpetrated in January and November. Murders and injuries in 2015 resulted from both unsophisticated lone actor terrorist attacks and well-coordinated, complex attacks by groups of militants. The carefully planned attacks demonstrated the elevated threat to the EU from a fanatic minority, operationally based in the Middle East, combined with a network of people born and raised in the EU, often radicalised within a short space of time, who have proven to be willing and able to act as facilitators and active accomplices in terrorism.

The attacks have led to political reactions at all levels across the EU. On 29 January 2015 - three weeks after the attack on the editors of the French satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo” in Paris - the Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Council issued the “Riga Statement”¹. In the statement, the Council asserts that counter-terrorism efforts must be reinforced both at national and EU levels, and that terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist financing are among the main threats to the internal security of the EU.

The Riga Statement was followed in quick succession by a European Parliament resolution², a Statement by the heads of Government³, the European Agenda on Security⁴ and the adoption of the new Internal Security Strategy⁵. All highlighted the importance of counter-terrorist efforts and the potential for EU action to make a real difference.

Against this background the need became apparent for an effective response to terrorism through enhanced cross-border cooperation between relevant counter-terrorist authorities, supported by a pro-active EU central information hub at Europol. In accordance with the Council Conclusions agreed by Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 20 November, Europol established the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), which officially started its activities on 25 January 2016. The ECTC is designed to engender trust and raise awareness among national counter-terrorism authorities about existing cooperation instruments at EU level, including Europol’s services and tools, thus maximising operational cooperation and information exchange in the area of counter terrorism.

Even before the ECTC was launched, Europol was already connecting its information exchange and analysis capabilities to support investigations into the deadly November 2015 Paris attacks. Europol’s Emergency Response Team (EMRT) was immediately activated to support the investigations in France and

Belgium on a 24/7 basis. This support included the deployment of analysts and specialists to Paris, to Interpol in Lyon, and to Brussels.

This new edition of the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), which Europol has produced on an annual basis since 2006, provides an overview of the failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks that took place in the EU during 2015, and of arrests, convictions and penalties issued. It has become clear that Europe currently faces a shifting and increasing range of threats emanating from jihadist groups and individuals. The so-called Islamic State has demonstrated its ability to strike at will, at multiple times and at a diverse range of targets. It has shown its prominence within the “global jihad”, while the threat posed by other jihadist militant groups has not diminished. The overall threat is reinforced by the substantial numbers of returned foreign terrorist fighters that many Member States now have on their soil, perhaps as many as a third of those who had travelled to conflict zones, some of whom could be instrumental in terrorist attacks. Another worrying development is the significant rise in nationalist (xenophobic), racist and anti-Semitic sentiments across the EU, each resulting in acts of right-wing extremism.

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Rob Wainwright
Director of Europol



¹ Council of the European Union, 5855/15

² European Parliament, 2015/2530

³ Council of the European Union, 12 February 2015, 56/15

⁴ European Commission, 28 April 2015, COM(2015) 185

⁵ Council of the European Union, 9951/15

KEY JUDGMENTS AND TRENDS

The overall threat to the security of the European Union has increased over recent years and remains on an upward trajectory. The main concern reported by EU Member States continues to be jihadist terrorism and the closely related phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, travelling to and from conflict zones. The attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 represented a clear shift in the intent and capability of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations designed to induce a high state of well-publicised terror. Other attacks committed by radicalised and violent jihadist individuals that occurred in the EU - such as the killing of two people in Copenhagen, Denmark, and the knife attack in Nice, France which wounded three soldiers - both in February 2015 - underscore the diversity of the threat. Most jihadist terrorist acts that took place in the EU in 2015 were performed in the name of Islamic State (IS). It is a highly challenging task for the security services and law enforcement authorities to prevent every planned terrorist attack by keeping track of the ever-increasing numbers of people suspected of being, in one way or another, sympathetic to IS ideology, and to focus their attention for unspecified lengths of time on those who might be willing and able to perform violent acts. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda affiliates - and AQAP in particular - are still a factor to be considered and a reason for the EU to focus on a broader range of jihadist terrorist groups.

The developments in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, such as the political unrest in Libya, enabling IS to take up a prominent position in countries bordering the EU, add to the overall threat to Member States.

Numbers of arrests for Jihadist terrorist activities have again increased in 2015 compared to 2014, illustrating the enormous efforts being undertaken across Europe to fight this kind of terrorism.

JIHADIST TERRORISM

Islamic State (IS, ISIL or Daesh)

Islamic State has, in the 18 months between its declaration that

it re-established the caliphate in June 2014 and December 2015, conducted or inspired at least 50 attacks in 18 countries that have killed 1,100 people and injured more than 1,700. Most attacks - including some public executions of 'spies' or other enemies - were carried out in the Middle East and North Africa. The emergence of branches of IS and al-Qaeda in South-East Asia, and a number of terrorist incidents targeting westerners in Bangladesh, might lead to an increased future risk of attacks and kidnappings in those regions.

Several European jihadists hold prominent positions in IS and are likely to maintain contact with terrorist networks in their home countries. The 13 November Paris attacks introduced IS's tactics of using small arms in combination with person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIED) in suicide vests, designed to cause mass casualties. The way these attacks were prepared and carried out - plotted by returnees, very likely receiving direction from IS leadership, and including the use of local recruits to carry out the attacks - lead us to the assessment that similar attacks could again be staged in the EU in the near future. IS has repeatedly threatened the Iberian Peninsula and EU members of the anti-IS coalition in their propaganda videos, making specific references to Belgium, France, Italy and the UK.

By 2015, it was already known that:

- IS terrorist cells currently operating in the EU are largely domestic and/or locally based;
- among domestic terrorists there is a change from a long radicalisation process towards rapid recruitment;
- in selecting targets, IS appears to have a preference for soft targets because they are more effective than attacks on critical infrastructure, the military, police and other hard targets. The former instil more fear in the general public than the latter;
- the nature and structure of IS training apparently enables its operatives (including returnees) to execute terrorist acts in an emotionally detached manner.

The Paris attacks of 13 November 2015 appear to indicate a shift towards a broader strategy of IS to intimidate Western audiences, signalling the possibility of more attacks against Member States of the EU in the near future. Increasing external pressure may lead the IS leadership to put more emphasis on operations abroad, in an



attempt to respond to western military action. The EU Member States that participate in the anti-IS coalition are now regarded as legitimate targets by jihadist terrorist groups. Terrorist cells ready to perpetrate a terrorist attack are largely domestic and/or locally based. Operations abroad could also be used as a tool to attract new recruits from Europe and the West in general in order to fight in Syria and Iraq. In the long run, however, one should expect the diversion of “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTFs)¹ to other groups less targeted than Islamic State, or to jihadist battlefields other than Syria and Iraq. Islamic State militants are also expected to migrate to other fronts or return to countries of origin should the current course of events in Syria and Iraq continue.

Many EU Member States regard attacks carried out by radical Islamists who are lone actors or small groups to be a serious risk, and one that increased in 2015. Also, EU-based Islamist extremists who have not had direct contact with terrorist groups in conflict areas, remain a threat. The UK and other Member States point to the effectiveness of terrorist media at inspiring and radicalising vulnerable individuals. IS continues to use their media activities to encourage aspiring terrorists to conduct lone-actor attacks.

Foreign terrorist travellers

A significant percentage of all foreign terrorist travellers in Syria/Iraq are now female. Approximately forty percent of all Dutch travellers that are, or at some stage have been, in Syria/Iraq are female. Women have proven to be very successful in facilitating and recruiting while still in the EU. Most of those who travel to Syria/Iraq marry fighters soon after arrival - or have already married fighters online before leaving - and give birth to children. Historical data suggests that women are less likely to (be able to) return than men.

Women are probably not currently and actively taking part in frontline combat, although they generally have been trained in the use of weapons. Their roles may change in the future, which may

have an effect on the nature and impact of IS operations in the EU. IS may already be using women as suicide bombers. Of particular concern are the children of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who live with their parents in IS territory. One third of the minors that are children of Dutch women currently living in Syria/Iraq were born there. In their propaganda, IS has often shown that they train these minors to become the next generation of foreign terrorist fighters, which may pose a future security threat to Member States.

Some returnees will perpetuate the terrorist threat to the EU via facilitation, fundraising, recruitment and radicalisation activities. They may also serve as role models for future would-be violent jihadists.

The presence of IS in Libya, and the security vacuum caused by political instability there, have also attracted high numbers of FTFs, especially from the countries of North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Irregular migration

There is no concrete evidence to date that terrorist travellers systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed. However, some incidents have been identified involving terrorists who have made use of migratory flows to enter the EU. In the investigations into the 13 November Paris attacks, it was found that two of the attackers had entered the EU through Greece as part of the large influx of refugees from Syria. A number of other suspected cases, including terrorist use of fraudulent travelling documents, have since been identified. A real and imminent danger, and one that will probably continue to exist for a long time, is the potential for elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee diaspora to become vulnerable to radicalisation once in Europe, and to be specifically targeted by Islamist extremist recruiters.

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

Due to the continuous rise in the number of irregular migrants entering the EU, including asylum seekers, and the increasing difficulties in accommodating them, the migration issue may remain the focus of social discourse and media coverage for a non-foreseeable period of time. In addition, it is likely that right-wing extremists and groups will reinforce their efforts to portray

1 The UN Security Council defined ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ in its resolution 2178 as “... nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”. (United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014): Adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd meeting, on 24 September 2014, S/RES/2178 (2014), www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014/shtml)



the asylum policy in a polarising manner and exploit the debate for its own purposes. A development towards a more intense and violent use of language by the right-wing scene in on-line social media and forums should be anticipated. Some Member States have noticed developments towards vigilante justice in the form of civilian street patrol groups. The Finnish authorities mentioned that in some towns these patrols were carried out by the “Finnish Resistance Movement”, which is part of the “Nordic Resistance Movement”, a Scandinavian National Socialist organisation with branches in Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

As well as violent acts committed by individual perpetrators or small groups of perpetrators in the form of bodily injuries and arson attacks, more violent offences, including murder, may increasingly occur in the future. Moreover, public figures, political parties, civic action groups and media that take a critical view of right-wing extremism may remain the targets of right-wing extremist agitation.

ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

There is no evidence of the PKK showing any intent to commit attacks against EU citizens or their interests. However, confrontations between Kurdish separatists and Turkish nationalists may well escalate in parallel to the Syrian and Turkish conflict. This may provoke PKK-affiliated groups to extend their activities in the EU, seeking violent confrontations with parties regarded as sympathetic to Turkish nationalism and/or suspected of a tolerance towards IS.

Availability of illegal weapons

The current situation concerning the availability of illegal weapons in countries neighbouring the EU, particularly in Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries but also in current conflict zones, may lead to a significant number of those weapons becoming available via the black market, posing a significant threat in the near future. Terrorists continue to have access to military ordnance and commercial explosives, as well as precursors and components needed for manufacturing explosive devices.

CBRN weapons

The phenomenon of individuals travelling for terrorist purposes to conflict zones increases the risk that expertise in the use of chemical weapons can be transferred to the European Union by returning foreign terrorist fighters. Both Syria and Iraq have had chemical weapon programmes in the past, as well as production facilities and stockpiles which may not have been completely destroyed, despite international community and OPCW efforts. Access to such material stored within the EU is very securely controlled and likely out of the reach of IS.

Critical infrastructure

One incident in June, in which the perpetrator drove a vehicle into gas, acetone and liquid air containers, and attempted to ignite canisters containing flammable chemicals; and another incident in July in which two massive simultaneous explosions took place at a petrochemical plant in southern France, exposed the vulnerability of such locations. In both cases, perpetrators were able to easily access the facilities, ignite highly flammable chemicals, create explosions and cause significant damage at the facilities. Organisations usually implement protection mechanisms and set security levels for their facilities based on the perceived risks and constraints of regulations. Those incidents demonstrate that chemical plants are now becoming a target of choice by terrorist groups.

The convergence of cyber and terrorism

The proliferation of cybercrime and the development of a professional, service-based underground economy have led to a lowered entry bar for non-technical criminals with regards to procuring the services and tools that they require to conduct their illegal activities, to concealing their illicit actions, identities and money laundering activities, as well as purchasing firearms and explosives. To a great extent this is done in an anonymous manner, which could have ramifications for terrorism as well.

As the technical capacity and forensic awareness of terrorist groups further increases, it is conceivable that the Crime-as-a-Service (CaaS) model could extend to terrorism as well.

Considering that there is evidently a blurring of the lines in the use of tools and techniques between Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups and profit-driven cybercriminals, it is also likely



that terrorists will be able to launch more advanced, and therefore harder to detect or prevent, attacks. This is of particular concern when it comes to critical infrastructure. This would suggest that terrorists are building expertise and more importantly are benefiting from the CaaS model, which provides the tools, services and attack vectors necessary to launch such an attack. One possible scenario could involve a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack with the aim of disrupting critical infrastructure and/or for extortion purposes.

With regards to the abuse of encryption and anonymity, terrorist groups like IS appear to have an advanced level of awareness. Al-Qaeda's use of in-house designed encryption software, Asrar al-Mujahedeen (Mujahedeen Secrets), Anders Breivik's manifesto

setting out best practices on the use of The Onion Router (TOR) and virtual private networks (VPNs), IS's preference for openly available secure communication apps such as Telegram, and the use of Darknets to purchase firearms, are all examples of terrorists being aware of the benefits of encryption and anonymity online.

Furthermore, as with non-terrorist cybercrime, terrorists are able to operate from remote locations, minimising the risk of detection created by travelling or preparing an attack in the target country.

It is therefore important to consider the likelihood of future attacks being based on new modus operandi with a stronger cyber dimension. Terrorists have certainly demonstrated their flexibility and willingness to learn and further develop their technical skills.

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU IN 2015

- In 2015, 151 people died and over 360 were injured as a result of terrorist attacks in the EU
- Islamic State introduced tactics of carrying suicide belts in mass-casualty attacks in the EU
- 211 failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks carried out in Member States
- 1077 individuals arrested in the EU for terrorism-related offences
- Court proceedings for terrorism charges concluded in relation to 514 individuals

1.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

The number of attacks slightly increased in 2015 compared to 2014. A total of 211 failed, foiled or completed attacks were reported by six Member States, and almost half of them (103) by the UK. The attacks resulted in 151 fatalities: 148 in France, two in Denmark and one in Greece. These figures are markedly higher than those of 2014, when four people were killed and six wounded.

The UK reported the highest number of terrorist attacks (103) in 2015¹, followed by France (72) and Spain (25). The number of attacks in France in 2015 increased for the first time, after a continuing decrease in the preceding four years. This increase can be attributed to the jihadist terrorist attacks that the country had to endure, and the occurrence of seven right-wing attacks - the first that have been reported since 2010. The number of separatist attacks in France continued its downward trend from 125 in 2012, to 50 in 2015. In Spain, 18 attacks were classified as separatist and seven as left-wing.

As in previous years, the attacks specifically classified as separatist terrorism accounted for the largest proportion, followed by jihadist attacks. The latter increased sharply from one in 2014 to 17 in 2015. A similar increase was seen in right-wing attacks, of which nine were recorded in 2015 against none in 2014. The number of left-wing attacks remained stable at 13. Attacks classified as jihadist terrorism caused 150 fatalities, of which 148 were in Paris in January and November, and injured over 250 persons. Of the 17 attacks, 15 took place in France in two series, both in Paris, and two separate incidents; the two others took place in Denmark on the same day and were committed by the same perpetrator.

In January 2015 the office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris was attacked by two brothers operating in the name of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), causing the death of 12 people, including one policeman. Two days later four people were killed after they were taken hostage in a Jewish supermarket in Paris by an attacker claiming to belong to Islamic State (IS). The deadliest attacks in Europe in a decade took place in Paris in November, causing the deaths of 130 people. Another 368 people were wounded.

Similar to 2014, firearms were used in at least half of the attacks reported by Member States. Explosives were used in 24 attacks (22%), which is a continuation of the decrease in the use of this modus operandi.

However, it is worth noting that the UK reports on Dissident Republican (DR) groups having deployed attacks with a variety of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as firearms, incendiary devices and, in one case, a grenade.

In 2015, a total of 1077 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences, which is a significantly higher number than that of 2014 (774), and is a continuation of the upward trend. Most arrests occurred in France (424), Spain (187) and the UK (134). The number of individuals arrested on suspicion of terrorism-related offences increased in 11 Member States, most notably in France (2014: 238, 2013: 225). The largest proportion of arrests in the EU was linked to jihadist terrorism (687), as it was in the two preceding years (2014: 395 and 2013: 216). Arrests for both separatist (168) and left-wing terrorism (67) rose compared to 2014 (154 and 54 respectively). The number of arrests for right-wing terrorism decreased from 34 in 2014 to 11 in 2015.

¹ The UK contribution does not specify attacks according to terrorist affiliation.

Compared to previous years there was a notable increase in arrests of individuals aged under 25, from 87 (in 2013), to 178 (in 2014) and 268 (in 2015), corresponding to the increase in the numbers of arrests for terrorism-related offences. The overall number of arrested women nearly doubled from 96 in 2014 to 171 in 2015. An even sharper increase was noted in the number of females arrested for offences related to jihadist terrorism: from 6 (in 2013) to 52 (in 2014) and 128 (in 2015).

Nearly two-thirds of the arrestees (63%) were EU citizens. The majority were born in the EU (58%). In 2015 there was a notable increase in arrests of individuals of Russian origin in the EU (from 18 in 2014 to 53 in 2015), of which 21 were linked to IS and 13 were women. Almost half (44%) of all arrests were made on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. The proportion of arrests concerning attack-related activities rose in 2015 (23%) compared to 2014 (13%).

1.2. TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Financing of terrorism


- Social media instrumental in raising and moving funds for terrorist purposes
- Crowd-funding of terrorist activities an emerging trend

The size, structure and scope of terrorist organisations have evolved, and they have adapted their methods to raise, transfer and use funds accordingly. Financial networks have been set up, not only for operational needs, but also for propaganda, recruitment and training.

Funds cover operational expenses related to travel, the purchase of arms and explosives, false identity documents, vehicles, communication, accommodation and basic living expenses. The recruitment of new members and training of operatives also require significant amounts of money and a number of terrorist groups pay salaries to members and set aside funds to provide long-term financial support to families of jailed or deceased operatives.

Small cells and individual terrorists have relatively minor financial requirements. Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their facilitation networks are predominantly self-funding (for example, from their employment income, support from family and friends, social welfare and/or bank loans). The proceeds of criminal activities such as theft, robbery and credit card fraud, are another source of funding. In some cases, suspected FTFs have applied for small short-term loans from different providers simultaneously with no intention of repaying them. The perpetrators of the January Paris attacks were not in employment at that time; they made use of a consumer loan obtained with forged documents and cashed out, they had the proceeds of the sale of a car, and had cash linked to the sale of counterfeit goods.

Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects 2013 to 2015





In one case in Spain, members of a terrorist cell were engaged in value-added tax (VAT) and other fraud in different parts of the EU to fund the cost of travelling to conflict areas. The proceeds of the fraud were often realised in cash outside of the formal financial system.

Money value transfer systems² have also been abused by terrorists to move illicit funds, including by using insider agents or employees who knowingly facilitate the activity on behalf of terrorist groups.

Anonymity, easy integration with electronic payment mechanisms, and potential access to a wider number and range of sponsors and supporters, are all features that emphasise the role of social media in raising and moving funds for terrorist purposes.

Over 2015, there were a number of cases involving the exploitation of crowdfunding websites. Fundraising advertisements, often placed in social networks, specialised media, closed internet forums and thematic websites, are also sometimes used, even though it is apparent that donors are often unaware of the end-use of funds.

There are serious risks linked to electronic, online payment methods and anonymous pre-paid instruments (e.g. pre-paid cards). These pose an emerging terrorism financing vulnerability which may increase further, since the use and popularity of these systems are steadily growing. Many of these systems can be accessed globally and used to transfer funds quickly. While transactions are traceable in some cases, it proves difficult to identify the actual end-user or beneficiary (cards can be loaded with anonymous means, i.e. cash, and can be used for online purchases or cash withdrawals). Pre-paid cards were widely used, in France and other Member States, in the preparatory phases of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November.

Explosives

- Jihadist terrorists actively exploring new tactics, techniques and procedures in using explosives
- Home-made explosives (HMEs) are still the most common explosives used in IEDs
- Terrorist groups have tried to establish large clandestine

stockpiles of explosive precursors in the EU for future use in large-scale bomb attacks.

In 2015 terrorists' use of explosives varied across EU countries and between terrorist groups. The main change in modus operandi occurred in jihadist terrorist attacks, where new tactics, techniques and procedures were detected in conducting bomb attacks.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

For the first time in the EU, jihadist terrorists combined the use of firearms and person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIED) in a large-scale roaming attack in Paris. The suicide attacks in public places show similarities in tactics, techniques and procedures to those which had been previously utilised by jihadist terrorists outside the EU. The attacks resembled in particular those in Mumbai, India in November 2008 in terms of modus operandi, targets chosen, numbers of attackers and impact.

It is apparent that there has been a transfer of technical knowledge and capability in IED design and construction. Some elements of the IEDs utilised were slightly modified in order to adapt to the EU circumstances and available resources, e.g. the use of improvised components instead of relatively scarce military components.

Dissident Republican (DR) groups in Northern Ireland (UK) deployed a variety of types of attack in 2015 including: postal IEDs, under vehicle IEDs, command wire IEDs, radio controlled IEDs, use of grenades, incendiaries and firearms. The main explosive charge of those IEDs mainly consisted of low-explosives (pyrotechnics mixture and gunpowder), although in some cases a high-grade plastic explosive was used. All groups still retain access to a range of firearms and explosive materials.

Although in recent years there have been no terrorist bomb attacks linked to ETA, their logistical apparatus may still be operational. A number of ETA explosives caches were discovered in France and Spain in 2015. They contained large quantities of weapons and home-made explosives (HMEs), along with explosive precursors and other bomb-making materials.

Extremist groups in Greece mainly carried out attacks using flammable liquids, IEDs and improvised explosive-incendiary devices (usually ignited by a flame). During one investigation,

² Money service businesses.

Greek authorities discovered clandestine storage containing substantial quantities of firearms, explosive ordnance (rocket launchers), commercial explosives, HMEs, explosive precursors and bomb-making materials, ready to be used in an attack. Anarchist groups in Italy predominantly carried out arson attacks using flammable liquids and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). In addition, some terrorist attacks were conducted in which the perpetrators sent postal IEDs filled with a low-explosive charge. All of these improvised devices were constructed using commercially available materials.

Home-made explosives

Home-made explosives (HMEs) remain the most commonly used explosives in IEDs. Notwithstanding the easy access to bomb-making instructions on the internet, there is evidence that more expert knowledge is likely to have been transferred to terrorists through direct contact and experience. The transfer of knowledge to the EU has been facilitated by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and returnees. There are indications that some of the fighters in the conflict zones have received advanced training in manufacturing and using HMEs in IEDs. Moreover, recent investigations show that certain terrorist groups continue to establish large stockpiles of explosive precursors in the EU in order to manufacture HMEs.

Military explosives

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) and illicit trafficking in explosives from former conflict areas present a significant threat to the EU. A number of large shipments of illegal military-grade firearms and explosives, mostly from the Western Balkan countries, were seized in organised crime investigations in 2015. Terrorists are known to have acquired hand grenades, rocket launchers, and high-grade plastic explosives and detonators from organised crime groups. Explosive ordnance has also been acquired via theft from military explosive storage facilities and the illegal collection of ERW and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from former battle zones.

Commercial explosives

The threat posed by the misuse of commercial pyrotechnics and gunpowder endures, although they have generally been employed as sources of explosive compounds in smaller IEDs that did not result in casualties. Commercial explosives have rarely been used

in IEDs to conduct terrorist attacks, due to the manufacture, storage, sale and use of such explosives being strictly regulated. However, there have been reported incidents of burglary and the theft of explosives from storage facilities. In one case, a mining company employee was able to appropriate more than 500 kg of explosives and 150 electric detonators, which he subsequently attempted to sell on the black market.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances

- In former-Soviet Union countries, nuclear and radioactive materials have continued to appear on the black market since the early 1990s
- Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapon facilities in the EU remain an important target for jihadist terrorists or groups
- Chemical facilities or companies, especially these perceived as having a low profile until recently, can become a vulnerable target
- Terrorists prefer the use of conventional firearms and explosives because of their availability, simplicity and effectiveness.

The likelihood of a CBRN attack occurring is assessed as being low, but the consequences of such an incident remain serious. In 2015 no major terrorist incidents with chemical, biological, nuclear or other radioactive materials were disclosed by the EU Member States. To date terrorists and criminals seem to remain interested in using weapons that are easily available, not too complex to operate, and which have direct and lethal effects. These three factors – availability, uncomplicated knowledge and effectiveness – encourage terrorists to use conventional firearms and explosives.

Although CBRN materials remain highly attractive to terrorists, they are difficult to acquire, transport, handle and deploy without particular scientific knowledge and technology. Nevertheless, several incidents in 2015 involved the actual or attempted malevolent use of CBRN materials with criminal or unknown intentions. In recent years, jihadist terrorists and their sympathisers have regularly expressed threats involving CBRN materials in their propaganda.



In 2015 two unrelated events involving attacks on chemical facilities took place in France. Although they were not specifically classified as CBRN terrorist incidents, they perhaps illustrate the vulnerability of such facilities. In the first incident in June, the perpetrator drove his van into gas, acetone and liquid air containers, and attempted to ignite canisters containing flammable chemicals. He also decapitated his former employer and attempted to kill two other persons. It was apparent that he used his accreditation and insider knowledge to prepare and execute the attack. This event has been categorised as a jihadist terrorist act. In the second incident in July, two massive simultaneous explosions took place at a petrochemical plant in southern France. The explosions set alight two petrochemical tanks. A third explosion failed to ignite another tank. French authorities recovered remains of explosive devices and discovered holes cut in the fence protecting the plant. The motivation of the perpetrators remains unknown. In both cases, perpetrators were able to easily access the facilities, ignite highly flammable chemicals, create explosions and cause significant damage at the facilities. Organisations usually implement protection mechanisms and set security levels for their facilities based on the perceived risks and constraints of regulations. These incidents demonstrate that chemical plants - seen as having a low-profile until recently - are now becoming a target of choice for terrorist groups.

Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapon facilities in the EU also remain potential targets for terrorists. Of note is a case that occurred in December 2015 in Belgium. It was reported that, during a house search of a suspect linked to the November Paris attacks, a video was found containing surveillance footage of a senior executive of a nuclear research site.

The deliberate contamination of water supplies is seen as a plausible CBRN scenario. A few days after the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, a number of protective suits, gloves and masks used to protect individuals from exposure to biological contaminants, were reported missing from a locked room in a hospital in Paris. On the same day, when the incident was reported to law enforcement, the French Prime Minister warned that the risk of biological and chemical attacks cannot be ruled out in France, and he increased the country's security level and measures. Subsequently, the public water supply company in Paris took preventive measures to counter the potential threat, and to allow water quality inspectors and investigators to detect any contamination more easily. Additionally, access to the company's

main premises was significantly reinforced and was strictly limited.

Thefts of radioactive sources are usually financially motivated, often due to the value of shielding containers or housing devices, and not necessarily for the source itself. In 2015 for example, two incidents involving the theft of radioactive sources, which are commonly used in various authorised applications in industry, medicine and research, were reported by Poland. Nevertheless, there were no reported cases of radioactive materials being used to deliberately injure or poison people.

In the European Union, trafficking cases are rare because nuclear and other radioactive materials are relatively well safeguarded, both by regulation and enforcement. However, in EU neighbouring former-Soviet Union countries, nuclear and radioactive materials have continued to appear on the black market since the early 1990s. In 2015 incidents involving the attempted sale of radioactive materials by organised crime groups occurred in Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey. Although there is no information on potential links between the groups involved in these three cases and terrorist organisations, criminals with access to these materials can potentially play a role in acquiring and selling radioactive materials to terrorists.

The procurement of biological toxins such as abrin and ricin has been reported as taking place in underground marketplaces on the Darknet, on occasion using virtual currencies. Individuals and groups may attempt to acquire such substances for terrorist use. In addition it is difficult to control their precursors because they are found in the natural environment.

The phenomenon of individuals travelling for terrorist purposes to conflict zones increased the risk that expertise in the use of chemical weapons can be transferred to the European Union by returning foreign terrorist fighters. The use of chemical weapons in conflict areas is largely conditioned by availability and means of dissemination in the region. In the past, both Syria and Iraq had chemical weapon programmes, with production facilities and stockpiles that might not have been completely destroyed, despite international community and OPCW efforts. In Europe, like in most countries of the world, such production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons are banned, leaving the threat level almost non-existent. Additionally, CBRN materials and their precursors are under strict control of governments, keeping the threat at a



Figure 2: Terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU in 2015



minimal level. As a consequence, the risk lies particularly in the ability of those terrorist groups to transport such weapons in their entirety or in part onto EU soil, or to produce them locally within EU borders.

Communication

- Terrorist communication focused on radicalising young people in particular and justifying violence as a means to achieving political and pseudo-religious objectives
- IS employs a successful propaganda strategy tailored to different audiences
- Terrorists exploit opportunities for safe communication through the use of encryption, and take advantage of the efforts made by companies to ensure privacy and data protection for their customers

Terrorist groups continue to use the internet and social media extensively, mainly for dissemination of propaganda material but also for recruitment and fundraising. Over the past two years, they appear to have revised their communication strategies, adapting to efforts made by social media platforms and authorities to contain their online activities.

Some groups or individuals have adopted a decentralised strategy, being active on several social media platforms and using numerous accounts on each of them. While some groups spread their messages via dedicated social media accounts or—following suspension—recognisable reiterations thereof, others rely on a proliferation of separate, seemingly unconnected accounts, all posting similar content, or vast networks of personal accounts belonging to members or sympathisers, to multiply their messages. The competition between al-Qaeda and IS, and their move to social media, has increased the spread of jihadist terrorist propaganda to a larger proportion of the global online population.

IS, for one, has stopped maintaining a dedicated network of accounts on Twitter but has not refrained from using the platform. At the time of writing, new propaganda material was disseminated to a great number of accounts on Twitter simultaneously. Messages were not re-tweeted but copied and pasted into new posts. The postings constituted an amorphous mass of identical messages that were spread through a great number of accounts created

for this purpose. In this system, any disinformation spread by IS opponents was quickly identified by the online community of IS supporters and exposed. New messages could easily be retrieved from the platform by those interested, using a number of hashtags. Messages deemed authentic were relayed in the online community of IS followers in a 'viral' manner. This system made it extremely difficult to eradicate IS messages from the platform.

However, efforts by the general public to compromise IS hashtags by posting large quantities of unrelated messages, helped to dilute the group's propaganda significantly in the mass of communications. As a result, IS supporters faced more difficulties updating themselves via Twitter, in particular following the 13 November attacks in Paris.

IS employs a successful propaganda strategy based on messages that are tailored to different audiences. Its scope is global, aiming to reach out to vulnerable populations across the continents. The group has created a number of media outlets transmitting propaganda productions in several languages, adjusted for the cultural background of each target group. IS members of several nationalities appear in video messages calling on their compatriots to join the group or to carry out terrorist attacks in their countries of residence. With the exception of the senior echelons of IS, individuals, including foreign terrorist fighters, generally do not appear in more than one video, probably in an effort to foster a personality cult for the top leadership. Exceptions to this rule seem to obey the wish to achieve specific effects in propaganda, such as in the case of English statements preceding the beheading of western hostages.

IS uses a multi-layered approach in propaganda production and dissemination. This allows it to exploit, to the maximum, the possibilities provided by social media platforms with regard to personalised communication. At the same time, IS maintains control over the messages and shields its propaganda against attempts to spread disinformation.

The top layer is represented by the public pronouncements of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his official spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. Their statements constitute the general guidelines of communication, which are subsequently taken up, relayed, expanded, illustrated and magnified by the lower levels of IS's propaganda machinery.

The second layer concerns the group's official media outlets. Among these entities is the al-Hayat Media Centre, which is dedicated to propaganda productions in languages other than Arabic. For example, it produces the English-language magazine *Dabiq* and its French-language equivalent *Dar al-Islam* which aim, in particular, to recruit nationals and residents of European countries.

The third layer comprises the propaganda outlets of IS "provinces"³, which claim to report from their respective areas of operations but also implement instructions given by the central leadership. This has been exemplified by coordinated campaigns during which multiple "provinces" publish videos on identical topics almost simultaneously, which would not be possible without centralised direction.

A fourth layer can be identified in the activities of entities supportive of IS but which do not officially claim affiliation with the organisation.

Finally, a fifth layer is represented by individuals or groups located in IS-controlled territory, or even outside of it, who maintain social media accounts and try to provide practical advice to prospective recruits. Whereas they purport to speak in a private capacity, reporting on their personal experiences, their messages are always consistent with the guidelines provided by the central leadership.

Individuals and groups involved in terrorist and extremist activities use encryption or obfuscation in order to evade interception of their communications by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Terrorist groups encourage their followers to cover their traces with encryption software. Al-Qaeda and IS have gone as far as to develop their own tools. However, the use of these seems to be waning. More recently, terrorists, like other criminals, are exploiting the opportunities for secure communication provided by smartphone applications and other software, thereby abusing the efforts made by companies to ensure privacy and data protection for their customers. The development and accessibility of such software provide terrorists with the opportunity to communicate covertly without the burden of developing and maintaining their own tools. Terrorist groups publicise numerous detailed guides about how to remain anonymous and use mainstream tools and apps securely.

³ The Arabic term *wilaya* refers to a sub-entity of the caliphate governed by a *wali*, but is used in several Arab states at present in the sense of "province".

The Cyber Dimension

- Cyber terrorism: high potential but currently low probability
- The internet, internet-facilitated or dependent services and supporting infrastructure can be both a means of attack or a target
- Increase in the abuse of anonymity and encryption services and tools to hide geographical locations and protect data and communications is complicating monitoring terror suspects and following illicit financial transactions

The digital underground has evolved into a thriving criminal industry, providing services on demand and operated via criminal forums and marketplaces. This Crime-as-a-Service (CaaS) economy provides easy access to criminal products and services and enables criminals as well as other actors such as terrorists to launch low-risk and low-cost cyber-attacks with profits and impact disproportionate to their technical skills.

Traditionally, criminal forums and marketplaces operated in the open or Deep Web⁴. However, Darknets such as Tor – a freely available anonymity network – are increasingly becoming host to such sites, commonly known as hidden services. These offer a place to acquire almost any illicit commodity or service such as narcotics, weapons – including firearms and explosives – forged documents, stolen IDs, stolen credit card information and hacking tools, including zero-day exploits.⁵ Key services include infrastructure-as-a-service such as secure hosting services, which provide a high level of resilience against law enforcement interventions, virtual private networks (VPNs) and proxy services that play an important role in providing anonymity, and botnet rentals to launch, for instance, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks or large-scale online banking attacks. Hacking services, including support for advanced attacks such as economic espionage, and money laundering services are other examples of criminal offerings that are available online.

⁴ The term Deep Web refers to the part of the internet that is not accessible via standard search engines (e.g. password-protected sites, dynamically created or encrypted content). It is estimated that the Deep Web is considerably larger than the Surface Web.

⁵ A zero-day attack happens once a software/hardware vulnerability is exploited and attackers release malware before a developer has had an opportunity to create a patch to fix the vulnerability.



Transactions are usually conducted with virtual currencies, in particular Bitcoin, which alone accounts for over 40% of payments between criminals within the cyber-environment. The anonymity that these alternative payment methods offer makes detection of criminal transactions more difficult.

1.3 CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES

Court proceedings, verdicts and individuals in concluded court proceedings⁶

In 2015, 12 EU Member States reported to have concluded a total of 217 court proceedings in relation to terrorism.⁷ The concluded court proceedings concerned 513 individuals, 85 of which were female.

Nine individuals in Spain and two individuals in Greece were tried several times in the framework of different criminal proceedings in 2015⁸. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2015 was 527. Some defendants in Belgium and the Netherlands did not appear in court and were sentenced in *absentia*. In 2015, the United Kingdom reported the highest number of concluded court proceedings for terrorist and related offences, while Spain remains the Member State where the largest number of individuals were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences.

Some of the verdicts reported in 2015 are final while others are pending judicial remedy, as appeals have been submitted.⁹

⁶ Please refer to Annex 1 for additional information and clarification on the numbers mentioned in this section.

⁷ Contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2015 were sent to the drafting team by the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. As in 2014, the UK contribution for 2015 covers England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, unlike in 2013 when no contribution from Northern Ireland was received. The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. Similar to 2014, the UK data for 2015 refers only to convictions. In case a verdict pronounced in 2015 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one and reported only on the latest/final verdict.

⁸ In 2015, there were two individuals who were tried three times and seven individuals who were tried twice for different offences in Spain. In Greece, two individuals were tried twice for different offences. The verdicts pronounced in the different court proceedings were counted separately when analysing the data on verdicts.

⁹ According to Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, the information to be submitted

Type of terrorism¹⁰

In 2015, the majority of verdicts pronounced were in relation to jihadist terrorism. It is for the first time since 2008 that concluded court proceedings in the EU have resulted in a higher number of verdicts for jihadist terrorist offences than for separatist terrorist offences. In Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark and Sweden all verdicts concerned jihadist terrorism. The highest number of those (120) was rendered in Belgium.

The majority of the verdicts for jihadist terrorism concerned offences related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq. In 2015, Member States reported to Eurojust an increase in prosecutions and convictions of foreign terrorist fighters. These prosecutions and convictions concerned individual travellers, as well as recruitment and facilitation activities and networks. In some cases, individuals were arrested prior to departure, while other cases involved returnees or persons who are still believed to be fighting in Syria and/or Iraq, or who may have died in battle.

In Sweden, the Gothenburg District Court found two returnees from Syria guilty of terrorist crimes and sentenced them to life imprisonment in December 2015. The two men had travelled to Syria and taken part in the fighting there in the spring of 2013. As a result of house searches carried out upon their return, police found videos showing the execution of two prisoners near Aleppo, Syria. The videos, which constituted the main evidence against the accused, show a group of some six men that had been involved in the murder. Apparently, the videos of the execution had been done for propaganda purposes; however, as far as it is known, they had never been published on the internet. The persons involved had hidden their faces behind veils. According to the court, the two accused had taken such an active part in the execution-like killing that they should be regarded as perpetrators of that crime, regardless of the fact that the actual killing had been done by others. The analysis of the videos done by the National Forensic Centre concluded – based on a comparison between personal details

to Eurojust is in relation to final convictions. Due to the specifics of reporting, Member States submit information on both final and not final decisions. Therefore, reference is also made to those decisions pending judicial remedy and they are included in the reported numbers.

The data provided by the United Kingdom did not distinguish between final verdicts and verdicts pending judicial remedy. As reported, all convictions in the United Kingdom are effective from the moment of their being pronounced, even if an appeal is made.

¹⁰ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the numbers that follow.

shown in the videos and the accused - that it was extremely likely that the two accused were among the men in the videos. The court ruled that the murders were to be considered a terrorist offence as they were intended to instil fear and intimidation. Due to the seriousness of the offence, the court did not consider any lesser penalty for one of the accused, who is seriously disabled after a gun wound in his head. The defence has submitted an appeal and the outcome is expected in late February or March 2016.

Following an investigation launched by the Belgian authorities against the group Sharia4Belgium, the prosecution brought charges against 45 persons. The charges included leadership of a terrorist group, participation in an activity of a terrorist group, destruction of property under aggravating circumstances, illegal restraint in the framework of a terrorist group, spreading of messages inciting the commission of a terrorist offence, threatening with attacks, armed disobedience, forgery of documents and use of such documents. The investigation revealed that the group's leaders, with the exception of one, as well as all members of its hard core, had travelled to Syria. There they had joined the groups *Jabhat al-Nusrah* and *Majlis Shura Al-Mujahidin*. Thirty-six of the accused persons did not appear in court and were tried in absentia; some were believed to be still fighting in Syria or to have even died in battle. In its ruling in February 2015, the Court of First Instance of Antwerp held that Sharia4Belgium is a terrorist group, as defined by Belgian law. The evidence showed that the objective of Sharia4Belgium is to forcefully overthrow existing

political regimes and to replace them by a caliphate, in which only 'sharia' would be applicable. The group also engaged in organised indoctrination and recruitment of young people to participate in the armed conflict in Syria. The court acquitted one defendant and found the remaining 44 guilty as charged. It ordered prison sentences of between three and fifteen years, as well as monetary penalties. It further ordered the immediate detention of 41 of the convicted persons.

In September 2015, a court in Spain convicted two leaders and nine members of a terrorist network that had been recruiting, indoctrinating and training potential foreign terrorist fighters. The network had been established at the beginning of 2012 and included two cells operating in a coordinated manner in the Spanish town of Ceuta and in Morocco. Members of the network had financed and facilitated the travel of their recruits to Syria and Iraq, as well as their subsequent integration in the terrorist organisations ISIL and *Jabhat al-Nusrah*. In order to supervise the process, one of the leaders of the network, who resided in Brussels, had made numerous trips to the border zone between Turkey and Syria. The court heard that at least six foreign terrorist fighters recruited by the network had died in suicide attacks in the conflict zone. In its ruling, the court took note of the reference, which the prosecution made to the February 2015 judgment of the Court of First Instance of Antwerp in the case concerning Sharia4Belgium. The reference was based on an analysis produced by Eurojust and concerned the terrorist nature of the groups and their acts. Based




Figure 3: Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2013, 2014 and 2015, as reported to Eurojust. The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.



on the available evidence, the court found all defendants guilty and sentenced them to serve between 10 and 12 years in prison. One of them was also convicted of the illegal possession of firearms.

A recruitment network was also targeted by an investigation in the Netherlands, which resulted in the conviction of nine persons in December 2015. Six of them were found guilty of participation in a criminal organisation with a terrorist intent and received sentences of up to six years. They had been part of a recruitment cell that engaged in instigating, recruiting, facilitating and financing young people who wanted to travel to Syria to fight. Two of them are still believed to be fighting in Syria and were convicted in absentia. The court considered two of the other co-defendants to be followers and ordered lesser sentences. A woman, who was not part of the organisation, was also found guilty of spreading material with the purpose of inciting the commission of a crime. In its ruling, the District Court of The Hague held that the objective of the jihadist fighting groups in Syria is to overthrow the regime of the Syrian president and establish a pure Islamist society or state. Their purpose is to instil fear in large parts of the population of Syria. The court confirmed that the crimes these groups commit, such as murder, manslaughter, explosions, etc., are committed with terrorist intent and are, therefore, terrorist crimes.

As in previous years, the majority of the verdicts pronounced in Spain concerned separatist terrorism and in particular the terrorist organisation ETA. Courts in France, Germany and the Netherlands also convicted defendants brought to court for offences related to activities of other separatist terrorist organisations (e.g. the PKK and LTTE). Guilty verdicts for left-wing terrorist offences were handed down in Germany, Greece and Spain, while Spain was the only Member State that reported a proceeding related to right-wing terrorism.

A large part (36) of the female defendants in the concluded proceedings in 2015 appeared in court in relation to separatist terrorism offences, which confirms a tendency observed in previous years. In line with the general increase in the verdicts for jihadist terrorist offences, the number of female defendants tried in the courts of the Member States for such offences also increased from seven in 2014, to 27 in 2015.

Convictions and acquittals

In 2015, all reported terrorism-related prosecutions in Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Lithuania and Sweden resulted in convictions. Germany is the only Member State that reported no acquittals in the period 2010-2015.

In 2015, acquittals constituted 21% of all verdicts pronounced for terrorist offences. This percentage is slightly lower than those in 2014 (24%) and 2013 (23%) and continues the downward trend compared to the years before (30% acquittals in 2012 and 31% acquittals in 2011). In some cases, defendants were acquitted of terrorist offences but convicted of other offences, such as illegal possession of firearms, forgery of documents, arson, etc.

Prosecutions for jihadist terrorist offences had the most successful rate, with 94% guilty verdicts pronounced¹¹. Similar to 2014, the verdicts in relation to separatist terrorism in 2015 had the highest acquittal rate (47%).

Penalties

Courts in the Member States ordered various penalties for those found guilty of terrorist offences in 2015. They included imprisonment, monetary penalties, treatment in mental health care facilities, and community orders. In some cases the court also imposed restrictions on civil rights and bans on entering the national territory upon completion of the prison term, or revoked the citizenship of those convicted of terrorist offences.

The prison sentences ordered by the courts in 2015 ranged between seven days and 397 years. In some cases (part of) the sentence was suspended or made conditional for a certain period of time. In other cases guilty verdicts were handed down but no penalty was ordered yet.

The average prison sentence handed down for terrorist offences in the EU in 2015 was seven years, which is slightly higher than the reported average in 2014 (six years)¹². The majority (61%)

¹¹ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the numbers.

¹² For the purpose of the calculation of the average prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years of imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years. In the cases where the court ordered a minimum number of years of the life sentence to be served, the sentence was included in the overview with the minimum number of years indicated.

of the penalties handed down with the guilty verdicts in 2015 were of up to five years' imprisonment, which is slightly less than in 2014 (70%). The number of sentences of 10 and more years' imprisonment constituted 20% of all penalties, which represents an increase compared to 2014 (13%).

In 2015, the average prison sentence for left-wing terrorist offences was the highest (12 years), marking a slight decrease compared to 2014 (14 years). Separatist terrorism verdicts carried an average prison sentence of 10 years, which is lower than the one in 2014 (13 years). The average prison sentence given for jihadist terrorist

offences increased from four years in 2014 to six years in 2015.¹³

It should, however, be taken into consideration that the severity of the penalty in each case depends on the respective offence and cannot serve any comparative purposes. Also, in some Member States the average sentence is calculated on the basis of one conviction, while in others it is based on a considerably higher number of convictions.

¹³ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the overview.




Figure 4: Average sentences (excluding non-prison penalties) per Member State in 2015, as reported to Eurojust. The overview does not include Lithuania, where one individual was sentenced to stationary observation at a specialised mental health care facility, and Sweden, where two individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment.

2. JIHADIST TERRORISM

- **150 persons killed** in jihadist terrorist attacks in the EU
- **Significant increase** in the number of jihadist attacks, from 4 in 2014 to 17 in 2015
- EU Member States that participate in the anti-IS coalition regarded as legitimate targets by violent jihadist groups
- **Significant increase** in arrests for jihadist terrorism, from 395 in 2014 to 687 in 2015
- **Terrorist cells** ready to perpetrate a terrorist attack in the EU are largely domestic and/or locally based

2.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS IN THE EU

In 2015, France suffered a number of jihadist terrorist ¹attacks. On 7 January, two gunmen attacked the editorial staff of the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in their office in Paris, killing twelve and wounding eight. The perpetrators, brothers born in Paris to Algerian parents, were members of the loose network of North African youths, known as the *Buttes-Chaumont* group, who were radicalised in prison and in a small neighbourhood mosque in Paris. The eldest brother had spent several months in Yemen in 2011, where he is believed to have been trained by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). After the assault the perpetrators escaped in a stolen car to a location north of Paris, where two days later they took one person hostage in an industrial building. During the ensuing police intervention, both brothers were killed. A few days later, AQAP claimed responsibility for the attack on *Charlie Hebdo*, including that they had chosen the target, planned and financed the operation.

On 8 January, an unarmed police officer was shot from behind and killed as she attended a routine traffic incident in Paris. A bystander was shot in the face but survived. On 9 January, the same attacker killed four people during a lengthy siege at a

Jewish supermarket at a different Paris location. The perpetrator, who pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS), was an associate of the *Charlie Hebdo* attackers and claimed to have “synchronised” his attacks with theirs. He was killed in the police raid on the supermarket.

On 3 February, three soldiers were wounded in a knife attack in Nice. The soldiers were on patrol outside a Jewish community centre when they were targeted. On 26 June, a man attacked a chemical factory in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier. The perpetrator reportedly entered the premises in a car and set off several small explosive devices. Prior to this, he decapitated a man and impaled his head on the fence of the company enclosure. Banners with Arabic writing were found nearby.

On 13 November, a series of complex and synchronised attacks, perpetrated by three teams, were carried out on carefully chosen targets in Paris, France, which included a football stadium, a theatre, cafés and restaurants. The attacks clearly aimed to cause mass casualties. IS claimed responsibility, stating that the attacks were committed in retaliation for French airstrikes on IS targets in Syria and Iraq. A total of 130 people were killed, including 89 at the Bataclan theatre, where the attackers took hostages before engaging in a stand-off with police. Another 368 people were wounded in the same series of assaults, a large number seriously so.

Tactics similar to those used in Paris in November have been observed in attacks in countries outside Europe. The attacks resembled in particular those in Mumbai, India in November 2008 in terms of modus operandi, targets chosen, numbers of attackers and impact. This is the first time they have been employed in completed attacks in an EU Member State.

The profiles of the perpetrators of the attacks described above differ with regard to their links to terrorist groups active outside the EU. Some attackers had never been to a conflict zone; some were prevented from travelling; others had returned. For example, the Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attacker had not been to Syria, but had exposed himself extensively to violent propaganda materials produced by IS, including footage of beheadings. The individual responsible for attacking the soldiers in Nice had expressed his desire to travel to Syria to fight, but was prevented from doing so and, consequently, acted out his violent intentions in his home country. Perpetrators of the November Paris attacks were members of IS in Syria or Iraq.

¹ Please see Annex 5 for an explanation on the use of this wording.

In addition to the attacks in France, on 14 February, a gunman attacked a free-speech debate in Copenhagen, Denmark, hosted by a Swedish cartoonist (who had been previously targeted by assailants that considered he had insulted Islam). One of the attendees, a well-known film director, was killed and three police officers were wounded. Some hours later, the same attacker opened fire outside a synagogue, killing a Jewish guard and wounding two police officers. He was subsequently killed in a shootout with police.

On 17 September, an Iraqi individual resident in Germany, classified by the authorities as a potentially dangerous Islamist extremist, attacked a female police officer with a knife on a Berlin street, seriously injuring her. He was killed by a second police officer attempting to stop the attack.

On 6 December, a man was arrested by police after stabbing three people at a London Underground station. One victim suffered serious injuries. A witness claimed that the suspect screamed 'this is for Syria'.

Two foiled attacks could have caused substantial numbers of victims, had they been completed. On 16 January, two suspected jihadists were killed in an anti-terror operation in Verviers, Belgium, and a third was arrested. The suspects are believed to have been preparing an imminent attack. There are indications

that the suspected ringleader of the November Paris attacks was also a leading member of the Verviers network.

On 21 August, an individual known to authorities in three EU Member States as a jihadist extremist, tried unsuccessfully to attack passengers on a high-speed train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris. The perpetrator was armed with an assault rifle, pistol, knife and large amounts of ammunition. He reportedly viewed IS propaganda immediately before the attempted attack, during which he was confronted by a passenger whom he subsequently shot and wounded. He was eventually overpowered by other passengers, before he was able to fully carry out his attack.

2.2 TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Recruitment efforts by jihadist terrorists

- IS rhetoric focused on dualist division between believers and infidels
- IS promises believers a utopian society without distinction based on origin, language, colour or race
- Calls for Muslims to join IS apply to both men and women




Figure 5: Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism 2011 to 2015




Figure 6: Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism in EU Member States in 2015

Propaganda produced by terrorist groups aims to convey a set of messages to members and supporters to recruit foreign terrorist fighters and elicit action. An important aspect is the justification of violence and the refutation of opposing ideologies. Other messages aim to intimidate and deter opponents from taking action against them.

Terrorist ideologies aim to give simplistic explanations for fundamental grievances, such as individual failure or discrimination, and promise to solve them through violence. Preying on current debates, terrorist communications continue to attempt to radicalise people and to induce them to adopt views justifying violence. In order to appeal to the younger sections of society, videos and images are designed in ways that mimic computer or console games and films. Terrorist messages cover a variety of topics relevant to the interests of both terrorist groups and their followers. *Inter alia*, they include advice and instructions regarding living in an environment perceived as hostile; preparing and carrying out attacks; ideological texts justifying their actions; eulogies for deceased foreign terrorist fighters; and addressing the complaints from sections of society whom terrorists profess to protect.

Moreover, jihadist terrorist groups have created their own lexicon for their communication with supporters and potential recruits. Standardised terminology is used to classify friends and enemies. Since Islam rigorously prohibits the killing of fellow Muslims unless ratified by a court, Sunni terrorist groups justify violence against Muslims by negating their Muslim status. In their interpretation, enemies are aggressors fighting against the community of believers (*umma*), and are therefore to be killed, purportedly in defence of Islam. They declare Shi'is, Alawites and other Muslim sects, as well as other Sunnis who oppose them, to be unbelievers.

Many concepts used by terrorists for these purposes, as exemplified in titles of videos, online publications and magazines, are taken from eschatological traditions within Islam. IS, in particular, has exploited Islamic traditions according to which the final confrontation between good and evil will take place near the northern Syrian villages of Dabiq and al-A'maq. They describe the anti-IS coalition's attacks as the onslaught of evil forces against Islam and predict that IS will eventually prevail. Such references aim to glorify the terrorist group's violent activities by inscribing them in the framework of an apocalyptic conflict, whose final battle is said to be near.

IS rhetoric has remained focused on the Manichean division between believers and non-believers. In an effort to overshadow the propaganda of other jihadist terrorist groups, IS has largely replaced the image of the Muslim victim with that of the Muslim conqueror, taking revenge for alleged aggression against Islam. IS wants to appear defiant in the face of coalition attacks. Over the course of 2015, a whole series of IS videos have shown the execution of alleged anti-IS coalition spies, followed immediately by new threats, often in French or English. In parallel, IS propaganda attempts to refute anti-IS coalition military successes, systematically claiming they have destroyed civilian targets.

In addition, since it declared that it re-established the Muslim caliphate, IS has created a utopian image of life in the territory that it controls. The group promises a society without distinction based on origin, language, colour or race. All Muslims are said to be equal and linked by the brotherhood of Islam. IS goes to great lengths to cultivate the impression that it is a well-organised, functioning state.

IS considers it the duty of every Muslim to join it by migrating to the territories that it controls, an act that it labels—in a simplistic historical metaphor—a re-enactment of Prophet Muhammad's emigration (*hijra*) from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) are equated with the companions of the prophet Muhammad that left Mecca with him on his emigration to Medina (*muhajirin*, i.e. those who performed the *hijra*) and are, on this basis, awarded a higher status than the local population. The latter are compared to the native population of Medina that converted to Islam after the arrival of the prophet Muhammad (*ansar*, literally "supporters"). If Muslims refuse to migrate, the group considers it to be proof of apostasy. Leaving IS territories without permission is forbidden for the same reason.

In light of the large numbers of Syrians and Iraqis seeking refuge in Europe, *al-Qaeda* and IS have tried to dissuade people from leaving the conflict areas and contrasted this with the image of the Muslim fighter travelling there from abroad to defend Islam. In its September 2015 issue of Dabiq, for example, IS linked the dangers facing refugees on their way to Europe to their committing a major sin by not joining IS and, thereby, risking that they themselves and their children will fall into disbelief. In mid-September 2015, when the numbers of refugees trying to enter Europe reached unprecedented levels, IS embarked on a large-scale propaganda campaign, issuing a number of videos by provincial media outlets from Syria, Iraq and Yemen within a short period of time, all

conveying the same message, obliging Muslims to join IS instead of seeking refuge in un-Islamic lands.

With regard to the recruitment of women from western countries, IS openly calls upon women to travel to its territory, even without a male guardian (*wali*). This is in clear contrast to the positions of other jihadist groups such as *al-Qaeda*, which insist that women must not travel alone. Once women enter IS-controlled territory, this autonomy is rapidly revoked and their movement is strictly controlled. Attempting to return to their home countries is explicitly forbidden and punished.

IS expects women to obey their husbands, cater for children and educate them in line with IS ideology. They must be patient and perseverant in the face of calamities, including the loss of husbands killed in fighting. IS tries to make this position acceptable to women by promising that their husbands, following the true Islamic model, will honour and protect them. IS propaganda portrays women as empowered managers of their households, whose efforts are rewarded by the respect and affection paid to them by their husbands and relations. In addition, IS allows women to participate in weapons training and have an active role in the health sector and local female-only forces enforcing strict moral and dress standards in public.

Notwithstanding this, IS clearly uses the prospect of marrying young women to attract male foreign terrorist fighters. The restoration of slavery seems to serve the same purpose. In addition to their legitimate wives, male fighters are allowed to own female slaves, with whom they can—under IS's interpretation of Islamic law—have sexual relations. Aware of the fact that this might be an obstacle for the recruitment of women, IS frames this in a way that it believes makes it palatable: taking female slaves is described as the ultimate humiliation of non-Muslims and a good deed, as it gives the slaves the possibility to become Muslims. The rationale behind these arguments is supposed to give female recruits a feeling of superiority.

Calls for lone actor attacks in the West

- Lone-actor attacks still favoured tactic of both IS and al-Qaeda affiliates
- IS supporters urged to join IS in the territories it controls or to perpetrate a terrorist attack in their home countries

Both the *al-Qaeda* network and IS have called upon Muslims in western countries to perpetrate lone actor attacks in their countries of residence. The tactic was adopted as official *al-Qaeda* doctrine following the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, long before the schism of the jihadist terrorist movement. Before that date, the ideology of violent jihad allowed its followers to fulfil their individual obligation of contributing to the struggle by either participating in violent action, providing financial or material support, or by producing and disseminating propaganda. As a result of the emphasis put on lone actor attacks in western countries, the choice has now been limited to either joining a terrorist group abroad or perpetrating a terrorist attack in the West.

In 2015, the al-Qaeda network reiterated its appeal for lone actor attacks in western countries. For guidance on how to prepare such attacks, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the nominal head of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, referred potential perpetrators to its Inspire magazine. In a speech that marked the 14th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, al-Zawahiri called upon Muslims living in the “Crusader coalition” countries to plan and conduct attacks in their places of residence, rather than risking detection when trying to travel to conflict areas. He advised Muslims in the West to get practical instructions on how to procure weapons, select targets and conduct operations.

IS also renewed its call for lone actor attacks in the West. In early 2015, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani urged the group's supporters to target the “Crusaders” in their countries, “wherever they are found”. He stated that Muslims who can commit a terrorist attack in their country of residence, and fail to do so, will need to justify themselves on the Day of Judgment. In May 2015, IS leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi made it explicit that IS supporters must choose between travelling to join IS or perpetrating a terrorist attack in their home countries.

2.3 TRAVELLING FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

- More than 5000 Europeans are believed to have travelled to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq
- During 2015, the increase in airstrikes of the international coalition against IS, and the increase in measures to prevent

foreign terrorist fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq, may have lessened the movements to some extent

- Individuals and groups with experience of fighting in the conflict areas are assessed as more lethal on their return than other jihadist extremists

Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Europe continued to travel across the globe. In 2014, FTFs were present in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Chechnya, Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen; there is no indication to suggest that this situation changed in 2015. Syria and Iraq, however, continued to be by far the most prevalent locations for European violent jihadists. Numbers of FTFs in the region remain exceptionally high, compared to former surges in travel to join al-Qaeda-inspired groups in other destinations in the past.

Individuals and groups with experience of fighting abroad are assessed as more lethal. The perpetrators of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks had links to AQAP in Yemen. The perpetrator of the Thalys train attack and a number of the suspects involved in the November Paris attacks are believed to have previously travelled to and trained in Syria.

At the end of 2015, it was estimated that over 5,000 Europeans had travelled to Syria and Iraq. Individuals from Belgium, France, Germany and the UK account for approximately three-quarters of this total. Most are male and at an age that enables them to serve as fighters.² Many EU Member States reported that individuals continued to travel to Syria and Iraq, but in some cases, at rates that appeared to be slowing. The Netherlands, for example, saw individuals leaving for the conflict zones at an average rate of approximately five per month in 2015, but noticed a marked decline in the number of individuals leaving or attempting to leave, relative to the previous year. Spain stated that the flow of new volunteers has stabilised to a low level. Italy also reported that the movement of FTFs making their way to Syria and Iraq remained constant.

In June 2014, IS proclaimed the establishment of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq and this may well have served as a motivational factor for a number of individuals to travel there. Over 2015, the increase in allied airstrikes, in international cooperation, and in prevention measures taken by authorities in the concerned states,

may have lessened the movements to some extent. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that calls by senior members of al-Qaeda and IS to attack targets on home soil in the EU have subsequently accelerated.

A significant number of FTFs have returned, and this will likely continue. Overall volumes of returnees have again been reported as increasing in some EU Member States, such as Germany, the Netherlands³ and Sweden. British FTFs also continued to return to the UK. Around one third of those who have travelled are believed to have returned, some of whom have been assessed as posing a potent threat.

The training and combat experience gained by returning FTFs means that they will have increased capability to carry out attacks, either under direction or independently. Furthermore, some individuals undergo specific psychological conditioning during time spent in conflict theatres such as Syria, enabling them to carry out terrorist actions. Most of the perpetrators of the 2015 attacks in France were returnees from conflict zones.

Terrorist groups such as IS and *Jabhat al-Nusra* clearly have access to EU nationals that are prepared to carry out suicide attacks (for 2015, examples were reported by Finland, the Netherlands and the UK). Modus operandi included vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), underlining the threat that such individuals pose should they return. FTFs from the EU have also been filmed carrying out executions (beheadings or shootings).

At the time of writing, national threat levels across the EU varied. The level was described as high in the UK⁴, Belgium⁵, Germany⁶,

3 It is worth noting however that the rate has slowed in the Netherlands, for example there were 9 successful returnees in 2015, compared to 32 in 2014. This might indicate that it is becoming increasingly difficult to leave IS territory, or that less people actually want to return to the Netherlands.

4 Since 29 August 2014 the UK National Threat Level has been at Severe – an attack is highly likely.

5 The nationwide threat level in Belgium is at level 3 (possible and real). The maximum level is 4 (very serious and imminent). Brussels was temporarily on level 4 in November 2015.

6 German institutions and interests both at home and across the world are exposed to a high abstract threat. As well as lone offenders and groups acting autonomously, internationally operating jihadist terrorist organisations are also seen as a major threat.

2 For example, Austria reported more than half of their fighters are below the age of 25; Belgium reported that 81% were between 18-35; Germany reported that the majority were younger than 30; Sweden reported that most were aged 18-30; the UK reported that individuals are increasingly aged under 26.

France⁷, Spain⁸ and Sweden⁹, reflecting the continuing terrorist threat emanating from Syria and Iraq, as well as the threat from domestically-based lone actors. In 2013 the threat level in the Netherlands was raised from Limited to Substantial (where it remains at the time of writing), due to the large increase in Dutch FTFs in Syria, the rapid radicalisation of a number of Muslim youth groups, and the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Since November 2015, threat levels were also raised in Switzerland. Finland stated that the threat of a directed attack by international terrorist organisations or groups was low for them, but the threat of radical Islamist terrorist attacks committed by lone actors or small groups increased compared to 2014, and that their main terrorism threat was posed by returning FTFs. Countries such as Romania and Slovakia reported low threat levels, though they were cognisant of the risk posed by FTFs transiting their countries.

Motivations for travellers are also diverse. Some may be motivated by the opportunity to fight and/or by adventure, while others may have initially been more driven by religious, humanitarian or political aims. Radicalised individuals and groups generally express anti-western concepts and claim that Muslims are oppressed by the West and that it is necessary to act in defence of the Muslim *umma*. Many are also likely to have been attracted by the utopian idea of the caliphate. As well as the expressed ideological and religious reasons, underlying personal circumstances and experiences (for example, social marginalisation and/or criminal history) may contribute to the decision to support a terrorist organisation. In addition, the allied airstrikes might be interpreted as enmity towards Muslims in general, thus serving as a further motivational trigger.

Recruiters may try to take advantage of social, economic and personal problems that make individuals susceptible to radicalisation. In Finland, for example, they have been reported as targeting young people who have a criminal background or do not have a strong family support network. Slovenia reported a new trend of converting marginalised individuals from the Roma community, although it is believed that the main motivation for such conversions to Islam is financial (they are allegedly paid

to convert and to 'join the jihad'). In Belgium, in some cases individuals were given the specific role of recruiter. In other cases, individuals were called upon by friends, family or acquaintances already in Syria to join them, which they subsequently did. The Netherlands also reported that family members who are already in Syria do everything they can to persuade others to join them.

The journey to jihadist theatres continues to be self-funded in many cases, although in some instances individuals are assisted by funds received from sympathetic segments of the local community. In Italy, for example, no systematic involvement of support networks financing FTF travel has been found. FTFs from Spain financed their trips legally; for instance, one traveller obtained a bank loan to pay for travel expenses.

In previous years it had been reported that the majority of FTFs use their own genuine documents to travel. However, use of false documentation clearly does occur, as was the case with a number of individuals involved in the November Paris attacks. Furthermore, the Czech Republic, sometimes used as a transit country, reported the arrest of a Bosnian jihadist attempting to travel from Prague to Istanbul using a counterfeit passport, and a jihadist from Germany was arrested in similar circumstances. Deceased foreign terrorist fighters' identity documents can be forged or used by a look-alike. Consequently, in the Netherlands, the names of FTFs remain included in international indices of wanted persons even after their presumed deaths.

Turkey is still the primary transit country being used by FTFs to reach and return from Syria and Iraq. One return route reported by Poland for example, involved an FTF from Morocco travelling from Syria to Madrid via Istanbul, Belgrade and Warsaw. His compatriot, also suspected of being an FTF, was apprehended while travelling from Belgrade to Prague. There is no evidence to suggest a significant change in travelling *modus operandi* during 2015 – travellers from the EU may still travel directly or use airports from neighbouring or nearby countries to travel to and from Turkey, and/or the Balkan land route and sea routes via Italy and Greece. Nonetheless, according to information from Turkey, FTFs affiliated with IS are beginning to divert their routes and use more sophisticated tactics to enter Turkey.

During 2015, some EU Member States articulated concerns that the flow of irregular migrants might be exploited by terrorist organisations to facilitate the entry of radical extremist

7 France has currently declared a national 'state of emergency'.

8 The threat level in Spain is 4 (high risk), out of 5 (very high risk) levels.

9 In November the Swedish Security Service raised the terrorist threat level from 3 (elevated) to 4 (high), on a 5-level scale. The most serious threat to Sweden is at this time posed by al-Qaeda-inspired groups and individuals, who are encompassed by the concept referred to as 'violence-promoting Islamism'.

individuals, influence newly-arrived immigrants with jihadist terrorist propaganda, and move weapons and explosives into Europe through the Balkan route. Although there is no evidence of a systematic problem, the fact that some of the perpetrators of the November Paris attacks were recorded entering Greece alongside asylum seekers highlighted the presence of an occasional connection with the migration phenomenon.

Once in Syria and Iraq, the majority of FTFs appeared to have joined IS and *Jabhat al-Nusra*. Other groups they reportedly joined include: *Jaish al-Fatah* (Army of Conquest), *Harakat Ahrar al-Sham* (Levant Free Men Movement), *Jaish al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar* (Army of Emigrants and Supporters), and *Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya* (Islamic Levant Dawn Movement).

A number of European FTFs hold prominent positions in IS and are likely to be maintaining contacts with jihadist support networks in their home countries. Of further note is that several travellers from the Netherlands were reported to have joined subgroups of IS that are focused on carrying out attacks in the West. In addition, some FTFs play key roles in the propaganda activities of jihadist groups.

An increasing proportion of women have travelled from some EU Member States - for example from the UK, Belgium and, more markedly, the Netherlands. Females account for approximately 40% of the Dutch travellers currently in the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq. Only 11% of returnees to the Netherlands are female, perhaps underlining how difficult it is for women to leave IS territory. Around 20% of the travellers from Finland and Germany are women. An increasing flow of females and youngsters responding to the call of violent jihadist organisations has also been witnessed in Switzerland in 2015. In Spain, there has been a rise in the number of women arrested, with the majority being apprehended in relation to involvement in travelling to the conflict zones. One case concerned a woman who was the leader of a recruitment network, while another concerned minors who were arrested as they tried to travel to Syria with their parents, including one who was involved in a recruitment ring.

In many cases, women (including those with young families) go to Iraq and Syria to join their spouses. Many others travel to marry fighters and have children. The Netherlands, for example, reported that of the 70 Dutch minors who are in Iraq and Syria, a third were born there. Of further concern is how IS propaganda suggests that minors are being trained to become the next generation of fighters.

Information suggests that minors are also desensitised to, and participating in, violence¹⁰.

Women may also seek to radicalise others, take part in on- and off-line recruitment, and actively finance and facilitate terrorist groups and departure to them. For the time being, women are not believed to participate in frontline combat, though they are being trained in the use of weapons. Although there are currently no reported cases in which females have been involved in actually perpetrating a terrorist attack in Europe, open sources suggest they are being used to carry out suicide attacks in some jihadi theatres, for example in Nigeria's border areas, orchestrated by *Boko Haram*.¹¹ Furthermore, according to information from Turkey, a female foreign terrorist suicide bomber from the Russian Federation killed a Turkish police officer in Istanbul in January.

2.4 TERRORIST SITUATION OUTSIDE THE EU

EU citizens kidnapped or killed

- Terrorist groups abduct westerners for financial gain, propaganda and political purposes
- Hostages may be held by their captives for years on end

The threat of EU citizens being kidnapped remains high in conflict zones and areas surrounding them. In 2015, kidnappings of EU citizens and nationals of other western countries took place in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Egypt, Libya, Mali, the Philippines, Syria and Yemen. Furthermore, the risk is increased due to criminal groups kidnapping foreign citizens for ransom.

Terrorist groups abduct European and other westerners for financial gain, to attract international public attention and to exert political pressure. Images and videos of hostages are used to deliver threats to governments, state demands and convey propaganda messages. Islamic State included letters and articles signed by western hostages in its English-language online magazine *Dabiq*.

Five hostages, including two EU citizens, were killed in 2015. Five other EU citizens were released. At the time of writing, 10 EU

¹⁰ "The children of Islamic State", the Quilliam Foundation, March 2016. www.quilliamfoundation.org

¹¹ Now known as the 'West-African province' of IS.

citizens were still being held hostage by jihadist terrorist groups, as well as five people from other western countries.

In the enduring climate of instability and insecurity in Libya, six Italian citizens were kidnapped in 2015. Two were abducted in the Tripoli area, in separate incidents in January and March. One victim was released in June; the latter remains in captivity at the time of writing. Four Italian employees of a construction company were abducted in July near the cities of Zwara and Mellitah and also remain captive.

Two female Italian hostages, held in Syria by Islamist militants since August 2014, were released in January 2015. In the same month, IS executed a Japanese hostage and released footage of the execution. In February, a female US hostage, held by IS since August 2013, was accidentally killed during an airstrike by anti-IS coalition forces. IS continues to hold two EU hostages in Syria: an Italian priest, kidnapped in July 2013, and a British journalist who has repeatedly appeared in IS videos and has supposedly authored a number of articles in one of the group's online magazines.

In the Sahel region, a Dutch citizen held by AQIM in Mali since November 2011 was freed in an operation by French troops in April 2015. However, a Swedish and a South African citizen abducted alongside him remain hostages of AQIM at the time of writing. Also in April, *al-Murabitun* militants kidnapped a Romanian citizen in the border area of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.

In July 2015, the IS branch in Egypt, calling itself the Sinai province, kidnapped a Croatian citizen in Cairo and executed him in August. Two al-Qaeda hostages were accidentally killed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in January in a US airstrike: a US citizen abducted in August 2013 and an Italian abducted in January 2012, both in Pakistan, were killed in an attack targeting leading al-Qaeda members.

In the southern Philippines, two kidnapping incidents targeting western citizens occurred: in September, suspected *Abu Sayyaf* members abducted one Norwegian, two Canadians and one Filipino at a resort on Samal Island. In October, in the city of Dipolog (Mindanao province), unknown militants kidnapped an Italian citizen, resident in the region, who remains in captivity at the time of writing.

In Yemen, a French woman was kidnapped by unknown militants in February and released in August.

Developments outside Europe

Overview

- Antagonism between al-Qaeda and Islamic State
- The "Crusader coalition" seen as the overarching enemy by both

In 2015, the antagonism between *al-Qaeda* and IS continued to intensify. The two terrorist groups vie to appear as the sole defender of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of Muslims. The competition between them spread from Syria and Iraq to other regions as a result of IS's expansion into North and West Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Afghanistan. However, the two organisations and their affiliates appear to have avoided open confrontation on the battlefield, with the exception of a small number of sporadic confrontations in Syria and Libya.

Both sides sought to increase their influence among Muslim populations in general, and jihadist factions in particular. Firstly, they attempted to de-legitimise one another on the ideological level. From the IS perspective, the claimed re-establishment of the caliphate stipulated how all jihadist formations, including *al-Qaeda*, were obliged to join its ranks and pledge allegiance to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In a series of recorded messages by its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, *al-Qaeda* claimed that the declaration of the caliphate by IS was unlawful in Islam, as it was a unilateral act, made without prior consultation with the Muslim community. However, al-Zawahiri did not exclude cooperation with IS against the "Crusader coalition" or even a rapprochement with them, provided they accepted the jurisdiction of an "independent shari'a court" to settle the dispute.

Secondly, both camps pursued a strategy designed to intensify terrorist activity in western countries. Senior members in *al-Qaeda* and IS alike systematically called on Muslims living in the west to perpetrate isolated acts of terrorism, so-called lone actor attacks. Furthermore, trained militants of the two organisations planned and executed terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015: AQAP claimed responsibility for the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* in January; IS for the November attacks.

IS is believed to have recently trained groups of European militants in territory under its control, with the purpose of deploying them to Europe to conduct terrorist attacks. Due to the mounting pressure on IS as a result of anti-IS coalition operations in Syria and Iraq, the group may increasingly focus its efforts on transferring the battle to coalition countries.

Syria and Iraq

In 2015, a series of counter-offensives conducted separately by the Iraqi army, Kurdish forces and the Syrian regime, along with coalition airstrikes and attacks by rival violent jihadist and rebel groups, resulted in the disruption of vital supply lines, the killing of senior commanders, and loss of territory for IS in northern Syria and central Iraq. The military advancement in an area in central Syria around the desert city of Palmyra (or Tadmur in Arabic), the ancient ruins of which have been one of Syria's major tourist attractions, was IS's sole major territorial gain in its core area of operations in Syria and Iraq.

The situation IS is facing in the conflict theatre was reflected in a message by IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late 2015: he warned IS militants that "more trials and intense hardships are to be expected before final victory is achieved".

Jabhat al-Nusra (Support Front), al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, followed a strategy of forming a coalition with local jihadist, Islamist and moderate rebel groups fighting the Syrian government in separate locations in north-west and southern Syria, under the name *Jaysh al-Fath* (Army of Conquest). In early 2015, this coalition managed to gain control of a major Syrian city, Idlib.

Unlike IS, *Jabhat al-Nusra* has not publicised public executions of harsh punishments under the cover of implementing Islamic law in territory under its control. This has allowed the group to consolidate its presence among less radical local factions. Nevertheless, as part of the wider al-Qaeda network, *Jabhat al-Nusra* supports the belief of a global confrontation between Islam and the west. In that regard, although *Jabhat al-Nusra* presents itself as a force focussing exclusively on Syria, it has called for retaliation attacks against foreign actors, especially Russia, who are involved in the Syrian conflict. The penetration of *Jabhat al-Nusra* in the fabric of local society, and a wide range of organisations that sit across the less radical side of the Syrian militant spectrum, might have long-lasting implications not only

for the future of the conflict in Syria but also for developments in the international jihadist scene.

Turkey

In 2015, the conflict in Syria had significant spill-over effects in Turkey. The country witnessed a number of attacks against its security forces, especially in the border zone with Syria. These were claimed by IS or Kurdish forces opposing the Turkish government's intervention in the Syrian conflict. IS militants were also responsible for the killing of Syrian activists and journalists opposing IS, who had taken refuge in Turkey. Terrorist activity in Turkey is escalating, as the country becomes more deeply enmeshed in the Syrian conflict.

The Arabian Peninsula

The ousting of Yemeni president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the takeover of the Yemeni government by Houthi rebels, a Zaydi Shi'i group, in January 2015 led to a deterioration of the security situation in Yemen. The Houthis' advancement was met with resistance by forces loyal to Yemen's ex-presidents Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Ali Abdullah Saleh¹², Sunni militant groups and Saudi Arabia. The breakdown of central government control, together with the stated sectarian nature of the conflict, allowed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to strengthen its foothold in the south of the country. This happened in spite of the killing of a number of the organisation's leading members, including its long-standing leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi. In the wake of al-Wuhayshi's death, AQAP swiftly appointed Qasim al-Raymi as a new leader and replenished its leadership ranks with members released from Yemeni prisons in the turmoil following the Houthi takeover. In the meantime, the organisation demonstrated its resolve to continue with the planning and execution of terrorist attacks in the west, as demonstrated in the January 2015 attacks against Charlie Hebdo in Paris. In a message released in August 2015, including commentary on the Paris attacks, AQAP insisted that "individual jihad" was and would remain a strategic weapon at the hands of the group to strike in enemy land.

The IS franchise in Yemen conducted its first terrorist attack in March 2015, targeting two Zaydi mosques in the capital Sana'a. The organisation claimed to have established its presence in seven

¹² In May 2015, Ali Abdullah Saleh formally announced an alliance with Houthi fighters.

Yemeni provinces and to be active in the Yemeni civil conflict. Nevertheless, its influence must be considered limited, especially if compared to that of AQAP, which has been entrenched in local sections of the Sunni population for many years. In 2015, both camps focused on attacking the Houthi rebels and pro-government forces, which prevented them from turning against each other. However, the expansion of IS in Yemen feeds into the broader antagonism between IS and al-Qaeda, which currently dominates the global jihadist terrorist scene.

IS militants in Saudi Arabia stepped up their attacks against Shi'i and government targets in 2015, including suicide attacks against Shi'i mosques and shrines, and hit-and-run attacks on security patrol units and check-points. IS issued renewed direct threats against Saudi Arabia in late 2015, after the latter announced the formation of an anti-terrorism coalition of Muslim countries.

North Africa

In Egypt, the IS Sinai province, formerly known as *Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis* (Supporters of Jerusalem), which pledged allegiance to IS in 2014, remained the major jihadist terrorist threat in Egypt. The group suffered heavy losses from coordinated efforts by Egyptian security forces to curtail its operational capacities. Nevertheless, the group managed to expand its activities beyond the Sinai Peninsula to the Cairo area. In addition, it carried out attacks on foreign targets: the group kidnapped and subsequently beheaded a Croatian national in August, and claimed the downing of a Russian passenger airplane above the Sinai Peninsula in October. This bomb attack of an airliner carrying 224 passengers and crew was the first successfully completed terrorist bomb attack on an aircraft since 2004 when two domestic Russian passenger aircraft flying from Moscow were blown up by Chechen suicide bombers

In January 2015, IS announced the creation of three "provinces" on Libyan territory, taking advantage of the violence among the various political factions and armed militias in the country. The emergence of IS in Libya challenged the prominent position held by the pro-al-Qaeda group *Ansar al-Shari'a bi-Libya* (Supporters of the Shari'a in Libya). To establish its presence in Libya, IS reportedly relied on Libyan nationals, who had previously fought with IS in Syria or Iraq, and also followed a strategy of co-opting or coercing local tribes and militias into allegiance. The aggressive approach employed by IS provoked violent reactions by pro-al-Qaeda and Islamist groups, such as *Fajr Libya* (Libya Dawn),

leading to armed confrontation with them in northern parts of the country. As well as targeting local groups not willing to cooperate, IS carried out high profile terrorist attacks against the Libyan oil industry, western targets and interests, and foreign nationals in general. On 27 January, a French national, along with four other foreigners, was killed in an IS Tripoli province attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. A few months later, IS Barqa and Fezzan provinces advertised on social media the beheading of Egyptian and Ethiopian Christians, significantly raising the threat against foreign nationals living or working in the country. The presence of IS in Libya and the security vacuum caused by political instability have attracted high numbers of FTFs, especially from the countries of North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Increased pressure on IS in other conflict areas also seems to have been a reason for the influx of foreign militants to Libya.

In 2015, IS's influence extended beyond Libya, to Tunisia and Algeria, where smaller jihadist formations pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In Tunisia, IS claimed the attacks on the Bardo museum in Tunis on 18 March, and the Port el-Kantaoui tourist resort near Sousse on 26 June, which resulted in the deaths of 21 and 38 people respectively, mostly European tourists. In Algeria, *Jund al-Khilafa*, a splinter of al-Qaeda in the *Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), became the IS Algeria province. In both countries, IS-linked groups compete with AQIM and groups affiliated to it.

Sahel

After an initial retreat in the face of the French military-led operation Serval, terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region regained the initiative in attacking military and civilian targets in Mali and neighbouring countries. The major actors in the region remained AQIM and *Ansar al-Din* (Supporters of the Religion), which appear to cooperate to take control of territory in the desert regions of northern Mali. *Al-Murabitun* (a term that refers to soldiers guarding the frontline of Muslim territory against enemies), which resulted from a merger of the *Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) and *al-Mulathamun* (Veiled Men, a reference to traditional Tuareg attire) in 2013, split in May 2015 when a leader of one of its factions pledged allegiance to IS. In reaction, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the former leader of al-Mulathamun, who had split from AQIM in 2012, denied any al-Murabitun links of allegiance to IS. On 20 November, terrorists took 170 hostages in a hotel in Bamako. In the attack and the

ensuing confrontation with security forces, 20 people were killed. The attack was claimed by *al-Murabitun* in cooperation with AQIM. In December 2015, Belmokhtar's faction of *al-Murabitun* was reintegrated into AQIM. The faction operated henceforth under the name *Katibat al-Mulathamini* (Brigade of the Veiled Men), as it had before Belmokhtar's 2012 departure from AQIM. On 16 January 2016 an attack similar to that in Bamako occurred in Ouagadougou, the capital of Mali's southern neighbour Burkina Faso. This might indicate that al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are trying to extend their influence in the region in the face of the IS challenge.

In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau announced the merger of Boko Haram with IS and its rebranding into the IS West Africa province. On the operational level, the new IS province managed to retain control of territorial swathes of north-east Nigeria, despite mounting military pressure from the Nigerian Army. The organisation also targeted the neighbouring countries of Cameroun, Chad and Niger for being part - along with Nigeria and Benin - of a "Multinational Joint Task Force" against it.

Somalia and Kenya

Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin (HSM, Mujahidin Youth Movement) preserved its capacity to plan and execute major attacks in Somalia and Kenya against both military and civilian targets. In April 2015, HSM militants stormed the Garissa University in Kenya, taking around 700 students hostage and killing those identified as Christians among them. The attack showed that the organisation is still capable of conducting operations in Kenya's heartland, far from its centre of activity in the north-east of the country. In Somalia, the focus of HSM attacks remained the Somali government and AMISOM¹³ forces. In October 2015, the organisation suffered a split when a faction under the HSM commander of the Puntland region announced its allegiance to IS. The move came as a result of internal discontent with the overall leadership of the HSM but it also demonstrated IS's outreach to *al-Qaeda* affiliates.

Afghanistan

In January 2015, the creation of the IS Khorasan province was announced. The new formation, which is active in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, drew its members mainly from the *Tehrik-e-*

Taleban Pakistan (TTP, Pakistan Taliban Movement) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU formally announced its allegiance to IS in mid-2015. The move caused friction with the Taliban in eastern Afghanistan, which soon escalated to open clashes between the two groups.

In July 2015, the Taliban confirmed the death of its founder Mulla Umar, which had been kept secret for two years. The replacement of Mulla Umar by Mulla Akhtar Muhammad Mansur was met with opposition by some Taliban commanders, who refused to follow Mulla Mansur's leadership. By September 2015, the majority of Taliban, along with the *al-Qaeda* leadership, had given their oath of allegiance to the new Taliban leader. At the time of writing the main internal opposition to Mulla Mansur came from a splinter group led by Mulla Mansur Dadulla. Despite the intense internal strife and confrontation with the IS Khorasan province, the Taliban were able to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Afghan military and security forces, as demonstrated by the territorial advancement made in southern Afghanistan in the second half of 2015.

Indian sub-continent

Along with terrorist activity in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan in 2015, a number of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by separatist and sectarian militant groups. The main targets of the terrorist attacks were the Pakistani military and government, the Shi'i community and other minor religious sects.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) claimed responsibility for the killing of a Pakistani scholar and three bloggers (two of Bangladeshi and one of Pakistani origin), which it accused of being atheists and blasphemers.

In Bangladesh, an Italian citizen was killed on 28 September 2015 and a Japanese citizen on 3 October in hit-and-run terrorist attacks, later claimed by IS. The group also claimed further attacks against Shi'i shrines and Bangladeshi security forces.

¹³ African Union Mission In Somalia, a peace keeping mission operated by the African Union in Somalia, with the approval of the United Nations, created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007.

3. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

- Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks continued to decreased for the fourth consecutive year, **from 67 in 2014 to 65 in 2015**
- **168 persons arrested** for offences related to ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism
- **Most incidents** occurred in France and Spain
- **The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)** remains the principal target for Dissident Republican groups in the UK
- **Persistent risk** of violent confrontations between pro-Kurdish separatists and Turkish nationalists in EU Member States

3.1. DISSIDENT REPUBLICAN GROUPS

In 2015, 16 attacks took place in the UK. The activity levels are broadly in line with previous years. All Dissident Republican (DR) groups retain the intent and capability to conduct further attacks. The level of threat remains severe.

Police in Northern Ireland remain the principal target for DR groups. Members of the armed forces and prison officers have also been targeted. There were no injuries or fatalities caused by DR attacks in 2015, although in some cases these were very narrowly avoided.

DR groups deployed a variety of types of attack in 2015, including postal IEDs, command-wire IEDs (CWIEDs), under-vehicle IEDs (UVIEDs), radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), shooting attacks, incendiary attacks and a grenade attack. All groups retain access to a range of firearms and explosives.

Northern Ireland remains the focus of operations for DR groups. However, they continue to utilise the Republic of Ireland for fundraising, training, engineering, procurement, storage and, occasionally, as a preparatory base for attacks in Northern Ireland.

3.2 EUSKADI TA ASKATASUNA (ETA) AND RESISTÊNCIA GALEGA

ETA

Since the October 2011 definitive ceasefire announcement, the threat posed by the terrorist organisation, ETA, remains low. In 2015, the group did not perpetrate any terrorist attacks. It focused its activities in two main areas: propaganda and the control of the sealing of its arsenals within their logistical apparatus.

ETA's leadership and arsenals remained based in France, the country in which most of the group's activities occurred. The organisation maintained its strategy of relocating operatives to neighbouring countries to avoid arrest. Leading members of the logistical branch were arrested and substantial quantities of weapons and explosives were seized in joint French-Spanish counter-terrorism operations.

In 2015, ETA released five communiqués, two of them following major counter-terrorism operations. The group maintains its position confirming an alignment with the Basque separatist left-wing *Izquierda Abertzale* movement in their objective of an independent Basque Country. The issues of disarmament and disbandment were not addressed.

There were a number of dissident groups within *Izquierda Abertzale* that requested immediate amnesty for ETA prisoners. A few cases of street violence occurred, mostly in Vizcaya, and were attributed to the dissident youth group *Ernai*.

Resistencia Galega (RG)

In 2015, RG carried out no terrorist attacks. Although they continue to be assessed as having the intent and capability to commit attacks, the threat deriving from the group remains low.

Nine activists linked to the RG-affiliated extremist movement *Causa Galiza* were arrested. The network was banned due to its affiliation with RG.



3.3 KURDISTAN WORKER'S PARTY (PKK)

The *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) carried out no attacks in the EU in 2015. The group continues to be regarded as a terrorist organisation in the EU; the majority of Member States consider the level of threat posed by it to be low. In Germany, five suspects were arrested for membership of the organisation.

The PKK increased its fundraising, propaganda and recruitment after the termination of its ceasefire with Turkey in July 2015 and the subsequent escalation of the conflict. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands reported the continuity of the PKK's annual fundraising campaigns, which included collecting donations, membership fees and other revenues. The proceeds are believed

to fund the group's armed wing HPG (*Hezen Parastina Gel*, People's defence forces) as well as the group's counterpart in Syria, the PYD (Democratic Union Party), and its armed wing YPG (*Yekineyen Parastina Gel*, People's Protection Units).

Germany, France and Switzerland reported violent confrontations between members of the Kurdish and Turkish diaspora in 2015. In July in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Kurdish protesters gathered outside the residence of the Turkish ambassador. In September in Bern, Switzerland, a number of PKK sympathisers disrupted a demonstration organised by UETD (European Turkish Democrats), a Turkish pro-government group, resulting in 22 injuries and criminal damage. In Germany, there were seven arson attacks against Turkish premises and one attack on a Kurdish facility that caused criminal damage.

Figure 7: Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 2011-2015






Figure 8: Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in EU Member States in 2015

4. LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

- **Left-wing and separatist attacks** remained at lowest level since 2006
- **Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)** remained the weapon of choice
- **67 individuals arrested** in six EU Member States
- **Marxist-Leninist groups** engage in indoctrination and propaganda but not in violent acts

4.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In 2015, one person was killed in a terrorist attack by an anarchist terrorist group in Greece. On 21 February in Stilida, members of the previously unknown *Organosi Politofylakis Laiki Dikeosyni* (Militia Group Popular Justice) murdered the warden of Domokos Prison using an AK-47 assault rifle and a pistol. The attack indicates that Greek terrorists continue to have access to military-grade weapons, apparently due to their links to organised crime.

Thirteen left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks occurred in 2015 in the EU: in Spain (seven), Italy (four), and Greece (two). This was exactly the same number as recorded in 2014. A total of 67 people were arrested, the vast majority in Spain (37), Greece (16), and Germany (nine). The overall level of intensity and violence of the attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in the EU remained low.

In recent years, Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups have carried out no attacks in the EU. Members of such groups – active in the 1980s, the 1990s, early 2000s, and now dismantled – currently engage in propaganda and ideological indoctrination but not in violence.

Terrorist groups active in the EU largely adopt an anarchist, anti-authoritarian ideology and some of them occasionally use Marxist-Leninist propaganda elements.

During 2015, *modi operandi* and target selection by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups remained largely unchanged. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were once more the most frequently used weapon, and targets continued to include police and other government-owned facilities. The migration crisis, solidarity with imprisoned anarchists and other left-wing extremists, and socioeconomic developments were again the predominant themes for the justification of attacks.

In Italy, *Federazione Anarchica Informale* (FAI, Informal Anarchist Federation) is considered the most dangerous group, despite the fact that it has not carried out or claimed any attacks since 2013. FAI and the *Greek Synomosia Pyrinon tis Fotias* (Conspiracy Cells of Fire) are the main components of the International Revolutionary Front (IRF), a name used by numerous anarchist groups engaging in terrorist and extremist acts within and outside the EU. At present, it appears that the IRF's appeal is diminishing. There were only two attacks in 2015 claimed by groups using its name - arsons in Italy and the Czech Republic.

Suspected anarchist terrorist groups in Italy sent a number of victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs, or parcel bombs) to companies involved in the functioning of Centres for the Identification and Expulsion (CIEs) of irregular migrants. In May and June a total of four such IEDs were detected at mail sorting centres in Bologna and Milan. On 12 August, a parcel bomb exploded at the offices of a travel agency in Bari, causing minor injuries to the employee who opened it. On the same day, another parcel bomb exploded at the French embassy in Rome, without causing injury or damage. At the time of writing, no group had claimed responsibility for these attacks.

In Spain, left-wing and anarchist terrorist and extremist activity has decreased significantly, reflecting a loss of operational capability. No high-profile terrorist attack has occurred since 2013 and the seven attacks that were reported were all small-scale.

In the Czech Republic in April, three members of an anarchist group called Revolutionary Cells Networks were arrested and charged with preparing a terrorist attack on a train transporting military equipment. The group was known for having carried out

a series of arson attacks on symbolic targets, mainly police cars, in 2014.


In 2015, Turkish Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups maintained their level of activities in Turkey, as well as in several EU Member States. Militants of the *Devrimci Halk Kuvvetleri Partisi/Cephesi* (DHKP/C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) carried out a number of attacks in Turkey. In Istanbul in March, a prosecutor was taken hostage and eventually murdered; in August, a firearms attack took place at the US consulate.

DHKP/C sympathisers in European countries continued to provide financial and logistical support to the group in Turkey and to openly praise its terrorist acts, often covering up such activities by using legitimate associations. Financial support came mainly from businesses, the collection of donations, the sale of publications and

concerts. In 2015, as in previous years, EU Member States arrested a number of DHKP/C members and investigated financing and propaganda activities. In May, for example, authorities in Germany banned the *Yürüyüş* magazine used by the DHKP/C for propaganda, funding and recruitment. The ban was also implemented by the Netherlands and Belgium.

The *Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist* (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist) is another Turkish-based left-wing terrorist group with a presence in the EU. TKP/ML networks in Europe have been reported to provide logistical and financial support to the group. In April 2015, a total of 11 TKP/ML members were arrested in France, Germany, Greece and Switzerland. In November, a German citizen was extradited from France to Germany, in order to be tried on charges of membership of the TKP/ML.

Figure 9: Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorism 2011-2015



4.2. VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

EU Member States reported that, in 2015, violent left-wing and anarchist extremist activity remained at levels similar to the previous year. Left-wing and anarchist extremists continued to organise their campaigns predominantly from squats, and spread propaganda via the internet.

Extremist groups and individuals remained a threat to public order, mainly by engaging in violent acts during rallies and protests. Their typical tactics were to infiltrate peaceful demonstrations and attack police or cause criminal damage. In 2015, violence mainly occurred at high-profile events with extensive media attention, such as the official opening of the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt in March; the Expo 2015 exhibition (No Expo movement) in Milan in May; and the annual UN Climate Change Conference (Conference of Parties - COP21) in Paris in November. Riots instigated by left-wing extremists also broke out in Vienna in late January, directed against the *Akademikerball* (Academics' Ball) that was organised by far-right groups. In October, violent acts were committed in different locations in France, on the anniversary of the death of a French environmental activist.

In 2015, extremist activity remained dominated by traditional left-wing and anarchist themes, with a particular focus on the migration crisis. The establishment of refugee centres in several EU Member States triggered strong reactions in the left-wing milieu. On the one hand activists reacted, at times violently, to EU migration policies; on the other, they opposed anti-immigration events organised by far-right groups, for example, by seeking to engage right-wing extremists in violent clashes during counter-demonstrations.

Anarchist extremists continued to carry out arson attacks against targets related to the criminal justice system, the military and the "establishment" in general. Belgium, for example, experienced a number of attacks using improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) against premises and vehicles belonging to a company involved in building prison facilities. In Italy and Greece, similar arson attacks occurred against government-owned property and vehicles, as well as banks. The IIDs used were rudimentary and made of commercially available materials.

Anarchists carried out a number of actions across the EU in expressions of solidarity with imprisoned like-minded extremists in different parts of the world, and to support anarchist causes internationally. As in previous years, in 2015 communication amongst European extremist individuals and groups was extensive, primarily taking place via a host of anarchist and anti-authoritarian websites and also at international gatherings.

Anarchists in Greece, Italy and Spain appeared to be in close contact and were reported to have also met with extremists from Belgium and France. Individuals travelled from France to Greece in order to gain violent activism experience and to express their solidarity with imprisoned Greek extremists. Likewise, a number of gatherings took place in Belgium, attended by anarchists from France, Greece and Italy.




Figure 10: Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in EU Member States in 2015

5. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

- The right-wing extremist scene has increased its activities in some EU Member States
- Anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiments continue to be key themes of right-wing extremists
- A total of 9 attacks classified as right-wing terrorism in the EU in 2015, compared to none in 2014
- Arrests related to right-wing terrorist offences decreased from 34 in 2014, to 11 in 2015

5.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In 2015, France and Greece reported a total of nine right-wing terrorist attacks. There were no fatalities or injuries. Nevertheless, this marks a significant increase compared to 2014, during which no attacks were reported. Despite the use of explosives and firearms, the planning and execution of the attacks were not especially sophisticated; rather they seemed to be opportunistic.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks in Paris on the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* on 7 January and on a Jewish supermarket on 9 January, six mosques and a restaurant were attacked in acts classified as right-wing terrorism. In *Port-la-Nouvelle*, *Albi*, *Saint Jérémy*, *Vendôme*, *Soissons* and *Digne-les-Bains*, shots were fired at local mosques. In addition, a kebab shop near a mosque in *Villefranche-sur-Saône* was targeted by an improvised explosive device (IED).

In Greece, two IEDs detonated outside a bank in Kalamata and next to a statue in Mystras in October. Five suspected members of a group calling itself *Omada Epsilon* (Team Epsilon) were arrested and charged with the attacks. The suspects are believed to have planned further similar attacks on tax offices and courts in the Peloponnese region.

A total of 11 individuals were arrested for right-wing terrorist offences in France, Germany and Greece, compared to 34 in 2014. In addition to the arrests in Greece, two people were arrested in September in France on suspicion of preparation of an attack on a mosque in Arras. In Germany, four suspects were arrested in May on suspicion of having founded an association called the Old School Society. This group aimed to commit attacks against foreigners and left-wing activists.

Violent right-wing extremism

The majority of EU Member States did not report terrorist methodologies or tactics being used by right-wing extremists. The threat from (violent) right-wing extremism is considered to be low. Nonetheless, in some EU Member States the right-wing extremist scene increased its activities. Xenophobic offences in particular rose sharply and became more violent, and confrontations with left-wing activists and police continued to occur.

Islamophobia

In 2015, Islamophobic crimes against mosques and the Muslim community increased. Poland, for example, reported that in comparison to 2013/2014, the number of cases concerning Muslims and Muslim institutions has doubled and in France numerous incidents of Islamophobic hate crimes occurred, including firebombs, vandalism and threats.

In March, police in Poland arrested 13 members of the right-wing extremist group *Blood&Honour*, including a man accused of conspiring to burn down a mosque in Gdansk. During the arrests fascist paraphernalia, as well as live ammunition and air weapons, were seized.

Violence against refugees and asylum seekers

EU Member States have increasingly reported that the far-right try to exploit the current migration crisis in an effort to obtain support and stoke resentment. A number of attacks on premises used to house refugees occurred across the EU. For example, by the end of 2015, the German Interior Ministry reported more than 800 attacks compared to 198 in the entirety of 2014. In affected EU Member States such incidents range from acts of vandalism to arson attacks.



Most of these attacks were attributed to perpetrators with anti-immigrant right-wing views. However, a significant proportion of these incidents were carried out either by perpetrators that remain unknown, or by individuals or small groups with no direct links to right-wing extremism. In addition, public figures, political parties, civic action groups and media taking a critical view of right-wing extremism, received threats and/or became the target of attacks.

Nationalist groups

Nationalist groups in some EU Member States continued to negatively impact community cohesion and to generate disorder during demonstrations and protests. During 2015, event themes varied across the EU but were dominated by anti-Islam topics and the migration crisis.

In 2015, the German anti-Islam movement *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* (Pegida, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident) lost support, after initially attracting tens of thousands of people to its demonstrations at the end of 2014. Nonetheless, they held weekly demonstrations against the alleged growth of Islam and called for more immigration restrictions. Pegida's activities attracted imitators, using the same name, in other EU Member States, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK, albeit in much lower numbers.

In Austria and France, the anti-Islam movement *Génération Identité* (Identity Generation) appeared to align themselves with Pegida ideas. In addition to what was already noticed in Germany in 2014¹, Austria and Poland reported closer cooperation between neo-Nazis and football hooligans in 2015. Poland considered that hooligans constituted a group prone to extremist ideology, which facilitates their recruitment into right-wing militias.

1 TE-SAT 2015, p. 36.

Training camps and (access to) weapons

Right-wing extremist groups continued to have access to weapons. The majority of weapons used appeared to be knives and other cut-and-thrust bladed weapons. However, at times firearms were used, as for instance in the attacks on mosques in France, following the Paris attacks in January.

Right-wing extremists continued to receive self-defence and weapons training. Poland reported that in 2015 Polish nationalists participated in military training in a camp located near Moscow, Russia. In addition, instructors of combat training schools in Russia posted on the internet that they came to Poland to set up and run military camps. The camps provided combat training, such as fighting using knives and firearms, and military tactics. Photographs of individuals posing with firearms, supposedly taken at training camp events, were posted on social media platforms.

Internet

The internet remains of high importance to the right-wing scene. The trends, identified in previous years, of the increasing quantities and reach of right-wing internet propaganda, and the intensive use of social media for mobilisation and recruitment, continued in 2015. Right-wing extremist activities on the internet take place in both open and closed forums and tend to be uncoordinated.

In 2015, conversations and discussions on social media and internet forums within the right-wing scene were dominated by the migration crisis. The number of webpages with racist content has grown significantly throughout the EU. Many of them aim to incite people to adopt right-wing extremist views, while being careful not to cross the legal boundaries of free speech.

In addition to criticising EU Member States and EU institutions for their handling of the crisis, in forums and social media, right-wing extremists incite harassment and violence against migrants and refugee shelters, as well as politicians who favour the intake and accommodation of refugees. Such xenophobic and racist comments have even forced media outlets to close comments sections of related articles on their websites.

6. SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM

- **No terrorist attacks** related to single-issue terrorism were reported for 2015
- While activities in this sphere mainly consisted of lawful protests and rallies, a number of attacks carried out by **single-issue extremists** resulted in criminal damage
- **Single-issue activism** remained predominantly focused on opposition to large-scale construction projects, such as airports, train lines and wind energy farms, to the construction and function of nuclear power plants, and to animal testing

Anarchist extremists continued to attempt to appropriate single-issue movements and impose a wider and more violent anti-establishment agenda. This primarily occurred in countries with a durable anarchist extremist scene, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. In 2015, for example, the construction of the *Treno ad Alta Velocità* (TAV), a high-speed train line connecting Turin in Italy and Lyon in France, was repeatedly targeted by anarchist and environmental extremists. “No TAV” supporters carried out a number of actions against premises and vehicles belonging to businesses related to the construction and maintenance of the project, such as graffiti, sabotage of machinery, arson and damage to rail tracks and train carriages.

Activists from France and Italy cooperated in activities, but France experienced lower levels of violence. Initially, the “No TAV” movement comprised of members of locally affected communities. Following the infiltration of the movement by anarchists, subsequent protests and rallies became more violent. However, the total number of attacks decreased in 2015, a development partly attributed to the marginalisation of extremists by the more moderate members of the movement.

In 2015, environmental protests focused against oil and gas extraction were reported by the Netherlands and the UK. In the Netherlands, the offices of *Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij* (NAM, Dutch Petroleum Company) were vandalised in May, whereas in the UK there were largely peaceful demonstrations with minor disorder incidents.

Animal rights groups limited their activities to non-violent rallies and marches, online propaganda and legal action against animal testing by the pharmaceutical industry and research organisations. A few cases of small-scale criminal damage and harassment were reported in the UK.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: OVERVIEW OF THE FAILED, FOILED AND COMPLETED ATTACKS IN 2015 PER EU MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION

In 2015, six EU Member States reported a total of 211 terrorist attacks, of which jihadist attacks resulted in the deaths of 148 people and the injury of more than 350. The total number of terrorist incidents across the EU in 2015 slightly increased compared to 2014 (201). Similar to 2014, the UK reported most attacks (103) representing half of the total of terrorist attacks in the EU for 2015.

Terrorist attacks linked to separatist terrorism continued to decrease for the fourth consecutive year, falling from 167 in 2012, to 84 in 2013, to 67 in 2014, and to 65 in 2015. Similar to last year,

most incidents for the reporting period occurred in France (47) and Spain (18)¹.

Jihadist terrorist attacks were the second largest category (17) in 2015, after two years in which there were no attacks (2013), or very few (2 in 2014). Of note is that the 15 jihadist attacks recorded by France were mainly two groups of attacks: one in Paris on the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo, a police officer and a Jewish supermarket in January, and another one also in Paris on a stadium, bars, restaurants and a theatre, all on the same day in November. The number of left-wing attacks stabilised at 13 after a decrease from 24 in 2013 to 13 in 2014, which still is the lowest number since 2006. After two years in which no right-wing attacks were reported, there were 9 classified as such in 2015. There was no single-issue attack in 2015.

¹ The UK reported 16 attacks on national security targets during 2015 in their qualitative contribution to the TE-SAT 2016, but these attacks were not included/specified as ethno-nationalist and separatist attacks in the statistics provided.

Member State	Jihadist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Separatist	Single issue	Not specified	Total
Denmark	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
France	15	0	7	47	0	4	73
Greece	0	2	2	0	0	0	4
Italy	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
Spain	0	7	0	18	0	0	25
UK	-	-	-	-	-	103	103
Total	17	13	9	65	0	107	211

ANNEX 2: ARRESTS IN 2015 PER EU MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION

Member State	Jihadist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Separatist	Single Issue	Not Specified	Total
Austria	48	0	0	1	0	0	49
Belgium	60	0	0	0	0	1	61
Bulgaria	21	0	0	0	0	0	21
Cyprus	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Czech Republic	1	4	0	0	0	0	5
Estonia	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Finland	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
France	377	1	2	44	0	0	424
Germany	21	9	4	5	0	1	40
Greece	0	16	5	0	0	8	29
Ireland	0	0	0	41	0	0	41
Italy	40	0	0	0	0	0	40
Netherlands	20	0	0	0	0	0	20
Poland	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Portugal	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Romania	11	0	0	0	0	0	11
Spain	75	37	0	75	0	0	187
Sweden	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
UK	-	-	-	-	-	134	134
Total	687	67	11	168	0	144	1077

ANNEX 3: CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES (EUROJUST)

This annex contains statistical information on the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2015, as reported to Eurojust. It highlights some key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years. The key figures are supplemented by further details and clarifications, as needed.

Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences per EU Member State in 2013, 2014¹ and 2015,² as reported to Eurojust

Member State	2013	2014	2015
Austria	1	2	29
Belgium	8	46	120
Cyprus	1	0	1
Croatia	0	1	0
Czech Republic	8	1	0
Denmark	8	13	1
Finland	0	4	0
France	49	36	14
Germany	14	11	17
Greece	9	10	38

1 The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.

2 Contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2015 were sent to the drafting team by the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The information concerning Cyprus was provided by the Cyprus ENU. As in 2014, the UK contribution for 2015 covers England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, unlike in 2013 when no contribution from Northern Ireland was received. The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. Similar to 2014, the UK data for 2015 refers only to convictions.

Ireland	8	0	0
Italy	8	4	0
Lithuania	2	4	1
Netherlands	4	5	18
Romania	1	0	0
Slovakia	0	1	0
Slovenia	0	0	1
Spain	141	191	166
Sweden	0	0	2
United Kingdom	52	115	106
Total	313	444	514

- In 2015, 12 EU Member States reported to have concluded a total of 218 court proceedings in relation to terrorism.³
- The concluded court proceedings concerned 514 individuals. Eleven of those individuals were tried several times in the framework of different criminal proceedings. As a result, the total number of verdicts in 2015 was 527.⁴
- In 2015, there were 85 female defendants in the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences.
- In 2015, the United Kingdom reported the highest number of concluded court proceedings for terrorist and related offences, while Spain remained the Member State where the largest number of individuals were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences.

3 In case a verdict pronounced in 2015 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one and reported only on the latest/final verdict.

4 In 2015, there were two individuals who were tried three times, and seven individuals who were tried twice, for different offences in Spain. In Greece, two individuals were tried twice for different offences. The verdicts pronounced in the different court proceedings were counted separately when analysing the data on verdicts.

Number of court results in 2015 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust⁵

Member State	Jihadist	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Not Specified	Total
Austria	29	0	0	0	0	29
Belgium	120	0	0	0	0	120
Cyprus	1	0	0	0	0	1
Denmark	1	0	0	0	0	1
France	5	9	0	0	0	14
Germany	11	2	4	0	0	17
Greece	0	0	40	0	0	40
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	1	1
Netherlands	17	1	0	0	0	18
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Spain	13	159	1	3	1	177
Sweden	2	0	0	0	0	2
UK	0	0	0	0	106	106
Total	198	171	45	3	109	527

- In 2015, the majority of verdicts pronounced were in relation to jihadist terrorism. The highest number of those (120) was pronounced in Belgium.
- The majority of the verdicts for jihadist terrorism concerned offences related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq.
- In Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, all pronounced verdicts were related to jihadist terrorism, while in Greece all verdicts were related to left-wing terrorism. Spain was the only Member State that reported a proceeding related to right-wing terrorism.
- A large part (36) of the female defendants in the concluded proceedings in 2015 appeared in court in relation to separatist terrorism offences, which confirms a tendency observed in previous years. In line with the general increase in verdicts for jihadist terrorist offences, the number of female defendants tried in the courts of the Member States for such offences also increased from seven in 2014, to 27 in 2015.
- The average prison sentence for left-wing terrorist offences was the highest (12 years), marking a slight decrease compared to 2014 (14 years). Separatist terrorism verdicts carried an average prison sentence of 10 years, which is lower than in 2014 (13 years). The average prison sentence given for jihadist terrorist offences increased from four years in 2014 to six years in 2015.

⁵ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore included under the category 'Not specified'.

Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2015, as reported to Eurojust¹

Member State	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Acquittals in %
Austria	27	2	29	7%
Belgium	116	4	120	3%
Cyprus	1	0	1	0%
Denmark	1	0	1	0%
France	14	0	14	0%
Germany	17	0	17	0%
Greece	25	15	40	38%
Lithuania	1	0	1	0%
Netherlands	12	6	18	33%
Slovenia	0	1	1	100%
Spain	95	82	177	46%
Sweden	2	0	2	0%
United Kingdom	106	0	106	0%
Total	417	110	527	21%

¹ The UK data for 2015 refers only to convictions.

Conviction and acquittal rate per type of terrorism in 2015, as reported to Eurojust

Type of Terrorism	Conviction Rate	Acquittal Rate
Jihadist	94%	6%
Separatist	53%	47%
Left-wing	67%	33%
Right-wing	67%	33%

- In 2015, all reported terrorism-related prosecutions in Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Lithuania and Sweden resulted in convictions.
- Germany is the only Member State that reported no acquittals in the period 2010-2015.
- In 2015, acquittals constituted 21% of all verdicts pronounced for terrorist offences.
- Prosecutions for jihadist terrorist offences had the most successful rate, with 94% guilty verdicts pronounced. Similar to 2014, the verdicts in relation to separatist terrorism in 2015 had the highest acquittal rate (47%).²

² The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the numbers.

ANNEX 4: EUROPOL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

First-line investigative support: The European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC)

Recent developments that include the terrorist attacks in Paris, the clear shift in IS' strategy of carrying out special forces style attacks in the international environment, and the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters, pose new challenges to the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS).

To ensure an effective response to these challenges, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) has been established at Europol, under the authority and direction of the European Council. It builds further on the already established tools and counter terrorism (CT) networks of Europol, but includes a number of new features. These aim at enhancing the CT capabilities and at better facilitating information exchange among CT authorities, to bring cross-border cooperation in this field to a new level.

The ECTC is designed as a central hub in the EU in the fight against terrorism. In fact, it is the single point in the EU where CT operational information from law enforcement from all EU MS, but also from third parties, is brought together for analytical purposes. Specialised teams of CT analysts and experts work on this information to establish the wider EU perspective on CT phenomena for both operational and strategic goals. To ensure efficient information exchange, the ECTC benefits from an excellent network of CT officers throughout the EU and beyond.

The principal task of the ECTC is to provide operational support upon MS's request for on-going investigations, such as those following the Paris attacks. The ECTC can assist by cross-checking live operational data with the already available data at Europol, quickly bringing financial leads to light, and by analysing all available investigative details to assist in compiling a structured picture of the terrorist network. In case of a major terrorist event, the ECTC can contribute to the coordinated response. For this purpose different teams are available, often combined with CT experts temporarily seconded from MS, depending on the nature of the event.

Europol Information System (EIS)

One of Europol's core databases is the Europol Information System (EIS). Through this system, Member States directly share and retrieve information on suspects, convicted persons, events and devices connected with serious and organised crime and terrorism. The EIS offers first-line investigative support as this reference system allows MS to quickly identify whether or not information they are looking for is available in one of the EU MS, with cooperation partners or Europol. In case of a positive hit, more information may then be requested through the user's Europol National Unit. At the time of writing the EIS held information on over 3700 foreign terrorist fighters, contributed by 24 countries.

Further in-depth analysis: the Counter Terrorism Analysis Work File (AWF) and the Focal Points

For a more in-depth analysis, the ECTC works with the counter terrorism analysis work file (AWF). This file provides the framework for operational analytical support with the MS and third partners. As a result, the number of data categories that are permitted to be stored and processed is broader than in the EIS (within the CT AWF, there is focused analysis on certain CT phenomena). Existing and emerging terrorist phenomena are handled within separate focal points. In these highly secure environments the information is collected, cross-matched and analysed. This is done by dedicated teams of CT analysts and CT experts. Within CT, a major focal point is 'Travellers', which deals with foreign terrorist fighters. In response to the concerted efforts of Member States with the assistance of Europol the amount of data on foreign terrorist fighters within Focal Point Travellers increased substantially in 2015, reflecting the increase of entries on foreign terrorist fighters in the EIS.

The ECTC uses an integrated approach, meaning that data inserted in one system is automatically cross-checked against all other databases at Europol, to close intelligence gaps. In addition regular manual checks are carried out.

Information Exchange: SIENA

In an organisation like Europol, with its main focus on information exchange, secure and swift transmission of data is essential, especially when it comes to CT data. Information from

a Member State must reach Europol, and vice versa, without the risk of interception. To facilitate this information exchange, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) was designed and has been in use for a number of years by MS, Europol and third parties that have operational cooperation agreements with Europol.

A dedicated area has been created within SIENA especially for CT authorities. This means that CT authorities now have the possibility to send information directly to Europol or other CT authorities. Until very recently, countries could only use SIENA for sending their contributions on terrorism to Europol indirectly, through the Europol National Unit and Liaison Bureau. The extended infrastructure now also allows CT authorities from different countries to directly exchange information amongst themselves, and the involvement of Europol is optional. However, it is recommended that Europol is involved, otherwise possible links to other MS and third partners may remain undiscovered.

In practice, this means that every CT officer in the Member States can check the EIS from their own computers, or can directly send information to, or receive information, from the focal points. The options described for sharing information are at the discretion of the Member State. The dedicated SIENA CT environment is already operational with 95% of all MS, and in total 42 CT authorities, now connected to the system.

Internet Referral Unit (IRU)

Terrorists' use of the internet and social media has increased enormously over the course of recent years. Jihadist groups, in particular, have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how social networks operate and have launched well-organised, concerted social media campaigns to recruit followers and to promote or glorify acts of terrorism and violent extremism.

As this is a problem that spans multiple linguistic audiences and jurisdictions, a common EU response was necessary, hence the establishment of an Internet Referral Unit (IRU) at the ECTC. The IRU has the following core tasks:

- To coordinate and share the identification tasks (flagging) of terrorist and violent extremist online content with relevant partners;

- To carry out and support referrals quickly, efficiently and effectively, in close cooperation with industry;
- To support competent authorities, by providing strategic analysis and operational analysis.

Terrorism Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP)

The ECTC uses a number of tools to help detect financing of terrorism, one of the most known is TFTP - the Terrorism Finance Tracking Programme. In 2010, the European Parliament adopted the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) Agreement.

Relevant information obtained through the TFTP is provided by the US Treasury Department to Europol, competent authorities of EU Member States and Eurojust (either spontaneously by the US, pursuant to Article 9, or upon request, Article 10), with the aim of combating terrorism and terrorist financing.

TFTP has proven to be a valuable tool in terrorism-related investigations - it enhances the ability to map out terrorist networks, often filling in missing links in an investigative chain. It is used to track terrorist money flows, allowing authorities to identify and locate operatives and their financiers, and assists in broader efforts to uncover terrorist cells.

EC3

Launched in January 2013, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) can deliver high-level technical, analytical and digital forensic expertise to support investigations of EU Member States and third parties in cases of convergence of cyber and terrorism.

Direct operational support for on-going cases

The ECTC's core business is to support MS in on-going investigations, for which it has several teams and analysts available to produce analytical products, ranging from cross-check reports to intelligence notifications, and risk and threat assessments. To provide direct operational support, and to also contribute to a coordinated response in cases of major terrorist attacks or threats, the ECTC applies a scalable approach where other teams can be activated depending on the need. For example:

Europol Emergency Response Team (EMRT):

This team exists of Europol experts and analysts with relevant backgrounds and experience, to support emerging investigations on a 24/7 basis.

First Response Network

The First Response Network (FRN) consists of nominated CT experts in the Member States (MS) who are experienced in international cooperation. If there is a major terrorist attack or threat, these experts are temporarily seconded to Europol to work as a team with Europol experts and analysts, to support CT investigations in affected MS, or to provide the EU picture on a certain CT phenomenon.

CT Joint Action Team and CT Joint Liaison Team

In case a longer period is required to support the investigation of an incident or threat, a CT Joint Action Team (JAT) and a CT Joint Liaison Team (JLT) are available, consisting of CT experts/analysts from the Member States and Europol CT experts and analysts. A CT Joint Action Team is more focused on a specific incident or threat, while a CT Joint Liaison Team focuses more on a certain CT phenomenon, with the view of potentially initiating joint investigations.

ANNEX 5: METHODOLOGY

The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America (USA), as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. In 2006 Europol replaced the TWP. The methodology for producing this annual report was developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.

The content of the TE-SAT is based on information supplied by EU Member States, some third states and partner organisation Eurojust, as well as information gained from open sources.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is

produced annually to provide an overview of the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU. The report also aims to present trends and new developments identified from the information available to Europol.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these.

This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol in consultation with the 2016 TE-SAT Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the past, present, and future Presidencies of the Council of the EU, i.e. Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia (the 'Troika'), along with permanent members, representatives from France and Spain, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), Eurojust, the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, and Europol staff.

For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qualitative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the EU, and data on arrests of people suspected of involvement in those offences, provided or confirmed by Member States. As in previous years, Eurojust collected data on the number of court proceedings in each Member State, the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings, the number of convictions and acquittals, the type of terrorism, the gender of defendants, the penalties imposed, as well as the type of verdicts – final or pending judicial remedy. Similar data were collected, when available, of offences in which EU interests were affected outside of the EU. Eurojust contributed data on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States and relevant amendments in national legislation on terrorism.

Included as 'arrests' are those judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. The fact that the person may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact the calculation of the number of arrests.

The definition of the term ‘terrorist offences’ is indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA)¹, which all EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the Framework Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 2016 respects Member States’ definitions of terrorist offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess whether a criminal event should be regarded as an act of ‘terrorism’ or as an act of ‘extremism’. Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2016 mentions criminal acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, when they were reported by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.

The EU Council Decision of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA), on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, obliges Member States to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences, and sets out the conditions

under which this information should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the data and the results were cross-checked with the Member States. In cases of divergences or gaps, the results were corrected, complemented, and then validated by the Member States.

Eurojust also collected data on prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences on the basis of the aforementioned EU Council Decision. The data used in this report concerns relevant court decisions and legislation amendments in 2015. Due to the specifics of reporting, Member States submit information on both final and non-final decisions. Therefore, reference is also made to those decisions pending judicial remedy. Verdicts from 2015 on which an appeal is pending are included in the reporting as pending judicial remedy. In cases where a verdict pronounced in 2015 was appealed, and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one. Eurojust’s contribution was verified with the Member States that provided relevant data.

Types of terrorism

The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. However, many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. It is worth noting that a categorisation of individuals and terrorist groups based on the ideology or goals they espouse should not be confused with motivating factors and the paths to radicalisation. The underlying causes that lead people to radicalisation and terrorism must be sought in the surroundings (structural factors) and personal interpretations (psychological factors) of the individual. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Jihadist

Jihadist terrorism is perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks or organisations that evoke their very particular interpretation of Islam to justify their actions. The term ‘jihadist terrorism’ is replacing ‘religiously-inspired terrorism’ in the TE-SAT, and the earlier used ‘Islamist terrorism’, because of the possibility that the crimes committed by a relatively small group of fanatics could be confused with Islam and wrongfully associate the religion of

¹ Amended by the Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008

millions with the atrocities performed by only a handful. The use of the term 'religiously-inspired terrorism' raised new questions and was problematic because it did not describe precisely enough the exact problem that the western world, in particular the European Union, is facing; not to mention the world in general, including the Middle and Far Eastern and African regions, where these terrorists are, and have been, claiming most of their victims. Over time several other terms have been considered, including but not limited to 'violent jihadism', 'Islamic militancy', and 'terrorism exploiting and/or abusing religion'.

Under the heading "jihadist terrorism", the TE-SAT is describing the terror inflicted by groups and individuals who, based on "selectively sampled holy texts, mythologised historical examples, conspiracy theories, prejudice and circular argument"², along with anti-western sentiments, anti-Semitism and homophobia, commit crimes against the general population, including fellow Muslims, in the name of Islam. Individuals and those that form part of these groups may or may not have religious backgrounds themselves, which anyhow for them may only offer a window of opportunity instead of being a driver for their crimes. Those responsible for the crimes committed in the EU were overwhelmingly individuals who, for various reasons, had recently fallen out of allegiance with their former western lifestyles, and had personalities that made them vulnerable to the recruitment activities of violent fundamentalist extremists. These people commit crimes that no individual, of any religious affiliation, could possibly justify in the name of his or her adhered religion; not in the least Islam.

Right-wing

Right-wing terrorist organisations seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model. A core concept in right-wing extremism is supremacism, or the idea that a certain group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture, etc.) is superior to all other people. Seeing themselves in a supreme position, the particular group considers it is their natural right to rule over the rest of the population. Racist behaviour, authoritarianism, xenophobia and hostility to immigration are commonly found attitudes in right-wing extremists. Right-wing terrorism refers to the use of terrorist violence by right-wing groups. Variants of right-

wing extremist groups are the neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, and ultra-nationalist formations.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorism

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to replace the entire political, social and economic system of a state by introducing a communist or socialist structure and a classless society. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. A sub-category of left-wing extremism is anarchist terrorism which promotes a revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian agenda. Examples of left-wing terrorist groups are the Italian Brigade Rosse (Red Brigades) and the Greek Revolutionary Organisation 17th of November.

Ethno-nationalism and separatism

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out a state for themselves from a larger country, or annex a territory from one country to that of another. Left- or right-wing ideological elements are not uncommon in these types of groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque ETA, and the Kurdish PKK organisations fall into this category.

Single-issue

Single-issue extremist groups aim to change a specific policy or practice, as opposed to replacing the whole political, social, and economic system in a society. The groups within this category are usually concerned with animal rights, environmental protection, anti-abortion campaigns, etc. Examples of groups in this category are the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).

² Jason Burke; "The New Threat from Islamic Militancy" (2015); The Bodley Head, London.

ANNEX 6: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIS	Automatic Identification System
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APT	Advanced Persistent Threat
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula <i>Tanzim qa'idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-'arab</i>
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb <i>Tanzim al-qa'ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami</i>
AQIS	Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
ATA	<i>Amnistia ta Askatasuna</i> Amnesty and Freedom
CaaS	Crime-as-a-Service
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
DHKP/C	<i>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi</i> Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/ Front
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DR	Dissident Republican
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
EDL	English Defence League
ETA	<i>Euskadi ta Askatasuna</i> Basque Fatherland and Liberty
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Member States
ERW	explosive remnants of war

FAI	<i>Federazione Anarchica Informale</i> Informal Anarchist Federation
FAI/IRF	<i>Federazione Anarchica Informale</i> Informal Anarchist Federation/ International Revolutionary Front
FTF	foreign terrorist fighter
HME	Home-made explosive
HSM	<i>Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin</i> Young Mujahidin Movement
IED	<i>improvised Explosive Device</i>
ICS	industrial control systems
IID	improvised incendiary device
INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant <i>Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wal-Sham</i>
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest <i>Jama'at al-tawhid wal-jihad fi gharb Ifriqiya</i> Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
OPCW	<i>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</i>
PBIED	Person borne improvised explosive device

ANNEX 7: AMENDMENTS IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON TERRORISM IN 2015

PEGIDA	<i>Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes</i> Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i> Kurdistan Workers' Party
PYD	<i>Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat</i> Democratic Union Party
RG	<i>Resistência Galega</i> Galician Resistance
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
TE-SAT	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TWP	Terrorism Working Party
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
UXO	unexploded ordnance
VAT	value added tax
VBIED	vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
VOIED	Victim operated improvised explosive device
VPN	virtual private network



BELGIUM

In 2015, Belgium adopted a new law to strengthen the fight against terrorism. The law of 20 July 2015 introduced a new Article 140(e) of the Belgian Criminal Code. The article incriminates travel from and into Belgium for terrorist purposes, and ensures the implementation of Operational Paragraph 6 of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014). It envisages punishment with imprisonment of five to ten years and a fine of between EUR 100 and EUR 5000.



CROATIA

On 30 May 2015 Croatia adopted amendments to its Criminal Code, which extend the criminalisation of preparatory acts (Article 103). In addition to preparation for the commission of criminal offences referred to in Article 97 (Terrorism) of the Criminal Code, Article 103 was amended to also cover the preparation to commit offences envisaged in Article 98 (financing of terrorism), Article 99 (public instigation to terrorism), Article 100 (recruitment for terrorism), Article 101 (training for terrorism) and Article 102 (terrorist association). Article 103 envisages imprisonment for a term of between six months and five years for such preparatory acts.



FINLAND

On 1 January 2015 some terrorism-related amendments to the Finnish Criminal Code came into force. In conformity with those amendments, receiving training for terrorism is criminalised

under Chapter 34a, Section 4b. Furthermore, Section 5a concerning the financing of terrorism has been simplified. As provided for by the amendment, the prosecutor no longer needs to prove that the financing has been linked to a certain terrorist act; it is enough if it can be proven that the financing has been intended for a terrorist group.



GERMANY

On 20 June 2015 amendments to the German Criminal Code entered into force. They supplement the existing provisions on the financing of terrorism, and criminalise the act of travelling for terrorist purposes.

A new subsection (2a) in Section 89a expressly criminalises travel, as well as the attempt to travel, with the intention of committing a serious violent act endangering the State, or of providing or undergoing training for the purpose of committing such an offence. The new provision also allows for those who travel – or intend to travel – to relevant conflict areas with such intentions, are stopped and arrested before they leave Germany. A new Section 89c has also been introduced, which makes the financing of terrorism a separate offence. The provision no longer includes a threshold of ‘not unsubstantial assets’ and is thus applicable to any collection and provision of funds with the intention, or in the knowledge, that they are to be used for terrorist acts. Section 89c contains a catalogue of provisions that define these terrorist acts in order to cover the offences falling within the scope of Article 2 (1) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex to the Convention. Section 89c does not require that funds be linked to a concrete terrorist act. It is not a requirement that such an act is even attempted. However, a recent decision by the Federal Court of Justice concerning the criminalisation of preparatory terrorist acts indicates that the person providing the funds would have to be aware that the funds are intended to be used for terrorism-related purposes. This new provision also criminalises the financing of terrorist travel in conjunction with the new subsection (2a) of Section 89a.



ITALY

On 17 April 2015, Law n. 43/2015 enacting Law Decree n. 7/2015, was adopted. It provides for measures in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA. The law makes it an offence to participate in a conflict abroad in support of a terrorist organisation. It also criminalises the organisation, financing, promoting or advertising of travel abroad for terrorist purposes, as well as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ training for terrorist purposes and self-training to commit terrorist offences. It simplifies the provisions concerning the financing of terrorism, by making proof that the financing was connected to a specific terrorist act no longer necessary. For all existing terrorist offences, the use of IT technology is now considered an aggravating circumstance.

Furthermore, the amendments in the Italian legislation concern the illegal possession or diffusion of identity documents that can be used to leave the country, the illegal possession of explosives precursors and the reporting of theft or disappearance of substances that can be used for the illicit manufacture of explosives. Investigation tools already in use for investigations into organised crime groups can now be used for investigations into terrorist offences, including the possibility to set up preventive lawful interceptions and to retain IT data, even when collected abroad. A legal basis was established for the creation of computer programmes to obtain data stored on a targeted computer system, and for conducting preventive interceptions in investigations into terrorist offences committed via computer or electronic technology.

Italy also adopted some new preventive measures. The police have been authorised to monitor and gather information on websites used to incite terrorism, and subsequently conduct covert investigations, including updating a blacklist of the relevant websites. In addition, upon request of the competent authorities, internet services providers are obliged to block websites and remove illegal online content linked to terrorist crimes. Furthermore, the envisaged measures include travel bans, monitoring of the financial assets of suspects, blocking or withdrawal of passports, expulsion from - and prevention of re-entry into - Italy.



LATVIA

On 12 February 2015 the Latvian Parliament, the Saeima, approved amendments to the Criminal Code, which entered into force on 19 February 2015. The amendments concern Articles 77.1 Unlawful participation in an armed conflict, 77.2 Financing of an armed conflict, and 77.3 Recruitment, training and sending to an armed conflict. They envisage punishment of imprisonment for a term up to 10 years and probation supervision for up to three years for those who unlawfully participate in an armed conflict, i.e. an armed conflict taking place outside the territory of the Republic of Latvia and directed against a State's territorial integrity or political independence, or otherwise contrary to the international law binding on the Republic of Latvia, the laws of the Republic of Latvia or binding international agreements. The same punishment is envisaged for those who directly or indirectly collect financial means or other property for, or for transfer to, a party involved in an armed conflict abroad, if the activities of that party are directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or are otherwise contrary to international law binding on the Republic of Latvia. The provision is also applicable in cases when the financial means or other property are collected for recruitment, training or sending a person to unlawfully participate in an armed conflict abroad. Imprisonment for a term up to eight years and probation supervision for up to three years is envisaged for those who recruit, train or send a person to unlawfully participate in an armed conflict outside the territory of the Republic of Latvia.



LUXEMBOURG

On 24 December 2015 Luxembourg adopted a new law, which implements the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014). The law introduced amendments to 13 articles of the Criminal Code and 12 articles of the Criminal Procedural Code, which are designed to improve the response to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. The amendments provide for a new definition of incitement to terrorism (Article 135-11), which

includes messages broadcast or communicated to the public in any other form, including through electronic communication networks, in the presence of others, or in a private or a virtual space, which could be accessed by other persons. The amendments also extend the definition of recruitment for terrorism (Article 135-12) and training for terrorism (Article 135-13). Also, the procurement and production of explosive devices and firearms was further specified in Article 134, which concerns the preparation of the commission of a terrorist offence. The amendments envisage that persons convicted of terrorist offences hand in their passports and ID cards to the competent authorities. Furthermore, the national jurisdiction was extended to any person, who on or from the territory of Luxembourg, travels, or prepares to travel to another State, with the intention to commit, organise, prepare or participate in terrorist offences. A new Section X-1 was also added to the Code of Criminal Procedure. This section foresees the possibility of an investigative judge imposing a ban on leaving the national territory and invalidating the passport and ID of a person who is the subject of a preliminary investigation.



MALTA

The Maltese Parliament adopted Acts III and VIII of 2015, amending the Criminal Code and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014). The Acts amend the definition of acts of terrorism and terrorist activities (Articles 328A et seq.). They now include the travel or attempt to travel for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist activities, or the providing or receiving of training in terrorist activities, as well as the financing, organisation or other facilitation of such travel. It includes acts of recruitment but also the production, distribution, dissemination, import, export, selling, transmitting, procuring, etc., for oneself or for another, a publication likely to encourage or induce the commission of terrorist activities or likely to be useful in the commission of such activities. With Act III of 2015 the Parliament strengthened the existing terrorism-related offences and broadened the scope of the existing provisions not merely to acts of terrorism but also to activities that are linked, directly or indirectly, to acts preparatory or conducive to terrorist offences.



PORTUGAL

On 23 June 2015 five acts that introduce amendments to the Portuguese terrorism-related legislation were published. The amendments introduced by virtue of Lei 55/2015 concern the extension of the law on organised economic and financial crimes to terrorist offences. Furthermore, in conformity with the newly adopted Lei 58/2015, the scope of terrorism in the Code of Criminal Procedure is amended to encompass the following offences: terrorist organisations, terrorism, international terrorism and financing of terrorism. Another amendment is provided for by Lei 60/2015, which criminalises publicly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorist offences and travelling for the purpose of committing terrorist acts. By virtue of Lei 61/2015, the law on covert actions was extended to terrorism as well. Lastly, in accordance with the Lei 62/2015, Portugal amended its law on preventing and fighting money laundering and financing of terrorism.



SLOVAKIA

The Slovak Parliament amended the Slovak Constitution and several other legal acts, as part of the so-called 'anti-terrorism package' adopted as a Constitutional Act No. 427/2015 Coll and Act No. 444/2015 Coll. In conformity with the amendment to the Constitution, Article 17 paragraph 3 was changed to extend the duration of the custody for crimes of terrorism from 48 up to 96 hours. The court was also given the power to rule on the custody of a person suspected of committing the crime of terrorism without stating the reasons of the custody. Crimes of terrorism are defined by Article 140b of the Criminal Code and include 'the offence of establishing, plotting and supporting a terrorist group under §297, the offence of terrorism and some forms of involvement in terrorism under §419, the crime committed by members of terrorist groups, and crime committed on specific motives under §140 point e)'. The offence of 'establishing, plotting and supporting a terrorist group' also became an 'especially serious crime', as defined in Article 10 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore,

the amendments introduce some other fundamental changes, e.g. the possibility to record the communication of a suspect or a convict by telecommunication means, which takes place while the person is in prison or in custody, with the exception of the communication with the defence lawyer; enlargement of the protection of witnesses who provide information; increased use of the temporary suspension of accusations or suspension and interruption of criminal prosecution of accused persons who cooperate with the authorities; extension of the rights of police, especially regarding the search of a vehicle and closing public areas in case of a danger; extension of the rights of the Slovak Information Service and the Military Intelligence.



SPAIN

On 1 July 2015 amendments to the Spanish Criminal Code entered into force. A new provision in Article 575.2 establishes as an offence any type of indoctrination or training for combat or military purposes with the objective of preparing to commit any terrorism-related crime. Moreover, access to communication services with terrorist content constitutes a terrorist offence in Spain. The provision applies to those preparing to commit a terrorist-related crime by accessing on a regular basis, acquiring or accessing content available online for the purpose of, or suitable for, the promotion of membership in a terrorist group or for cooperation with any such group or with their goals. A link to national jurisdiction is established whenever such content is accessed from Spanish soil. Another new provision in Article 578.4 of the Criminal Code introduces the possibility for judges to order the destruction, erasure or invalidation of books, files, documents, items or any other support used to commit terrorist offences, including the possibility to order the removal of the content accessible through the internet or electronic services.



UNITED KINGDOM

On 12 February 2015, the United Kingdom passed the Counter-

Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This act formed part of the government response to address the threat from foreign terrorist fighters, following an independent assessment by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre in August 2014, which resulted in an increase to the national threat level from 'Substantial' to 'Severe', meaning that a terrorist attack is highly likely. The act adds to existing powers to disrupt the ability of individuals to travel abroad to fight, and to return, and includes provisions to:

- enhance the ability to monitor and control the actions of those in the United Kingdom that pose a threat;
- combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism;
- provide the police with a power to seize a passport at the border temporarily, during which time they will be able to investigate the individual concerned;
- provide for a Temporary Exclusion Order to disrupt and control the return to the United Kingdom of a British citizen suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity abroad;
- enhance the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures regime, including stronger locational constraints on subjects, and a power to require them to attend meetings as part of their on-going management, e.g. with the probation service or JobCentre Plus;
- improve law enforcement agencies' ability to identify who is responsible for sending a communication on the internet or accessing an internet communications service;
- enhance the border security for aviation, maritime and rail travel, with provisions relating to passenger data, 'no fly' lists, and security and screening measures;
- create a general statutory duty on a range of organisations to prevent people being drawn into terrorism;
- put Channel – the government's voluntary programme for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism – on a statutory basis;
- amend the Terrorism Act 2000 to put beyond doubt:

- the legal basis of measures relating to preventing the payment of ransoms to terrorist organisations;
- the scope of the power for examination of goods at or near ports.
- extend the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to enable him to review a wider range of counter-terrorism statutes, and provide for greater flexibility in his reporting requirements.

On 3 March 2015, the United Kingdom passed the Serious Crime Act 2015. Section 81 of this act extends UK territorial jurisdiction over sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This enables the prosecution in UK courts of UK-linked individuals and those who seek to harm the United Kingdom, who have prepared or trained for terrorism overseas. The offences of preparation and terrorist training are already domestic offences, and have been frequently used by law enforcement partners. Any prosecution under this new measure requires the consent of the Attorney General in addition to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The measure came into force on 3 March 2015.

The Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2015, which received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015, also made amendments to the maximum tariffs of certain terrorist offences. Section 1 increases the maximum penalty on indictment for three terrorism-related offences to life imprisonment. These are the offences of making or possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances (section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883); weapons training for terrorism (section 54 of the Terrorism Act 2000); and training for terrorism (section 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006). Those provisions extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Section 1 also provides that a life sentence may only be imposed for one of these offences where the offence is committed on or after the date of the commencement of these provisions.

On 22 October 2015, the United Kingdom signed the Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the 2005 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. The protocol aims to set minimum standards at international level for the criminalisation of recruitment and receipt of training for terrorism, and of travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, and gives effect to UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), with which the United Kingdom is already compliant.



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